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Today, political scientists working with international organizations seek to resolve 
internal conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cyprus, and Kashmir. To solve such crises, 
political scientists have mostly tried to apply domestic comparative politics approaches. 
These techniques emphasize agreements among internal actors and have not been 
successful in most cases. In the case of the Transdniestrian conflict in the Republic of 
Moldova, mediators have found it difficult to achieve internal agreement because external 
factors also have played a significant role during the conflict. Therefore, even if an 
internal agreement is achieved, it will remain fragile due to the vulnerable geographic 
location of the Republic of Moldova and to the limited state capacity to counter 
influential external actors. For the purpose of solving the Transdniestrian conflict in the 
long run, this thesis analyzes the possibilities of creating regional complex 
interdependence around the Republic of Moldova, which would strengthen an internal 
agreement to resolve the conflict. Regional complex interdependence inter-connects the 
countries interested in the region around the Republic of Moldova: Romania, the Russian 
Federation, and Ukraine. This solution presumes external and internal interconnections 
based on the complex interdependence theory of neo-liberalism. The main potential 
drawback is that any asymmetrical dependencies in the initial stage of cooperation will 
imbalance the proposed complex interdependence causing unilateral dependence (most 
likely on Russia) leading other actors to take countermeasures.  
 In fact, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe as a neutral party 
has been being a legal umbrella for mediation since all parties consider it an appropriate 
organization for the negotiations. Nevertheless, creating such an arrangement requires an 
initial role of the United States of America and the European Union to balance Russian 
influence until the region becomes interdependent. At that moment, the continuation of 
the Transdniestrian conflict will become irrelevant because the pre-conditions for conflict 
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This thesis analyzes the possibility of creating regional complex interdependence 
around the Republic of Moldova to solve the Transdniestrian conflict in the long run. 
This conflict erupted after the collapse of the Soviet Union and still has the potential to be 
reignited due to unsolved internal and external disputes. In the case of the Republic of 
Moldova, due to its vulnerable geographic location, even if an internal agreement 
concerning the conflict is achieved, the peace settlement will remain fragile because the 
causes of the conflict, even though appearing to be internal, is also strongly supported by 
external factors. Therefore, to strengthen the internal peace settlement, this thesis 
proposes developing regional complex interdependence among the set of states 
historically interested in the region around the Republic of Moldova. Creating complex 
interdependence, as emphasized in the neo-liberalism paradigm of international relations 
theory, will eliminate the possibility that the conditions for Transdniestrian conflict will 
reappear cyclically. Such an approach and solution would also be a contribution to the 
entire configuration of the European security system. 















Many experts on internal conflict, such as Stuart J. Kaufman, describe conflicts 
on the post-Soviet Union territory, including the Transdniestrian conflict in the Republic 
of Moldova, as ethnic wars manipulated by elites. Kaufman argues that three factors are 
necessary for such a conflict to result: hostile masses, belligerent leaders, and inter-ethnic 
security dilemmas. All of these factors were indeed reflected in the Transdniestrian 
conflict in 1992, amplified by the foreign patron, the Soviet Union (later Russia).1 In 
contrast, Michael E. Brown emphasizes structural factors of the intra-state conflict. He 
argues that internal state conflicts have structural, political, economic, and cultural 
causes.2 These scholars mostly view the intra-state conflicts' causes through normative 
and domestic-level analysis, largely underestimating empirical and external factors. In 
fact, Matthew Evangelista concluded the Soviet Union collapse revealed other important 
factors. Indeed,  
more than seven decades of Soviet rule have left a legacy of ethnic 
division, economic disparity, and political uncertainty that creates 
powerful pre-conditions for internal conflict … [however] efforts to 
resolve conflicts anywhere in the former Soviet Union must give due 
weight to Russia's power and interests. That does not mean allowing the 
region to become a Russian sphere of influence. It does mean that 
strategies for influencing developments in the region must take into 
account Russia's involvement and try to shift Russian policy in benign 
directions.3 
This thesis does not reject the claims of the above-mentioned analysts. The empirical 
analysis of the development of the Republic of Moldova as a nation-state, however, 
demonstrates another pattern in the Transdniestrian conflict, where the aforementioned 
claims were only the pre-conditions. The fact that the Baltic Republics, despite having 
the same nationalistic development pattern and the same percentage of the Russian-
speaking population, did not produce similar conflict proved that the Transdniestrian 
                                                 
1 Stuart J. Kaufman, "Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova's Civil War," 
International Security, volume 21, issue 2 (Autumn, 1996). 
2 Michael Brown, "The Causes of Internal Conflict," in Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict, ed. Michael 
Brown et al. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2001), 3-25.  
3 Matthew Evangelista, "Historical Legacies and the Politics of Intervention in the Former Soviet 
Union," in The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, ed. Michael E. Brown (Center for Science 
and International Affairs John F. Kennedy School of Government Harvard University, 1996), 108. 
3 
conflict is not only internal. First, compare to the Republic of Moldova, Baltic States did 
not have controversial regions such as Transdniestria, which was historically used for 
psychological attacks and influences in Moldova (Bessarabia) from 1924 to the demise of 
the Soviet Union. Second, the conflict resolution has demonstrated that the 1992 conflict 
in Moldova is also about the historical collision of several states' interests in that region; 
one of them is Russia, an asymmetrically powerful actor, which cannot be influenced as 
Serbia was during the 1995 Dayton agreement regarding the Bosnia and Herzegovina 
conflict. Thus, conflicts such as the Transdniestrian one consist of a collision of external 
influences in the region. Therefore, conflict resolution also will depend on the relations 
among the influential external actors in the region. 
The Republic of Moldova,4 one of the smallest states of the former Soviet Union 
with a population of approximately 4.5 million people, is located in the Southeastern part 
of Europe between Romania in the West and Ukraine in the East. The capital is Chisinau. 
Also, it was known as the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR) created in 1940 
as a consequence of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact of 1939.5 It consisted of Bessarabia 
(the eastern part of the historical Moldova principality) and a part of the former 
Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR – future Transdniestria), 
artificially created by the Soviet Union in 1924 to facilitate the penetration of Soviet 
propaganda into the Kingdom of Romania and territorial expansion into Romania (for 
Bessarabia).6 When the Republic of Moldova in 1991 declared its independence from the 
Soviet Union, the Russian-speaking population of the former MASSR territory, on the 
left bank of the Dniestr River, seceded by de facto forming the Dniestr Moldovan 
Republic. The secessionists justified their policy under the pretext of protecting Russians 
and Ukrainians against anticipated discrimination by the Moldovan government and fear 
of reunification with Romania. From 1991 to 1992, armed clashes erupted resulting in 
1,000 deaths and 150,000 displaced citizens.7 The Transdniestrian self-organized forces 
                                                 
4 Former Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic of the USSR. 
5 Anthony Read and David Fisher, The Deadly Embrace: Hitler, Stalin and the Nazi-Soviet Pact 1939-
1941 (New York/ London: Norton & Company), 471-473. 
6 Charles King, The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture (Stanford: Hoover 
Institutions Press, 2000), 63. 
7 See Appendix in Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff eds., Ethnic Conflict in World Politics 
(Westview Press, 1994), 160. 
4 
were decisively backed by the Russian (formerly Soviet) 14th Army, based in 
Transdniestria. In fact, despite the cease-fire agreement and continuing negotiations, the 
conflict is not politically solved yet.  
Many Russian politicians perceive the Transdniestrian conflict in the Republic of 
Moldova as an internal ethnic struggle between "nationalists in Chisinau bent on union 
with Romania and ethnic Russians in Transdniestria fearful of being swept up in an 
enlarged Romania state [thus searching for independence]."8 Even some Western 
international relations specialists agree with that point. For instance, Stuart J. Kaufman in 
his article "Spiraling to Ethnic War" admits that "the conflict between the former Soviet 
Republic of Moldova and its separatists on the left bank of the Dniestr river is largely an 
ethnic conflict."9 However, Kaufman also indicates that it was organized as a civil war, in 
which the ethnic component played an important role. In reality, the Russian and 
Ukrainian ethnic component was used mainly as a mobilization factor, mostly only in 
Transdniestria, to achieve a political objective, independence. The striking facts of the 
conflict are that Moldovans and Romanians compose 40 percent of the Transdniestria and 
the majority of the Russian and Ukrainian population live throughout the Republic of 
Moldova's entire territory and do not support the Transdniestrian secession.10 
Furthermore, the Soviet ideology deeply impacted the new Moldovan identity and 
people; therefore, Moldovans truly started believing that Transdniestria was part of their 
land – a new political state – the Republic of Moldova. That fact neither Romanian nor 
Transdniestrian nor Russian politicians can understand even nowadays. Thus, the conflict 
seems more as a civil war for separatism, in which external actors played a crucial role in 
supporting the Transdniestrian objectives. 
Historically, that part of the region (former Bessarabia) has suffered from geo-
strategic influences. Until 1812, Moldova (including Bessarabia) was dominated by the 
Ottoman Empire. Then, in 1812 Bessarabia was annexed from Moldova to the Russian 
                                                 
8 Charles King, The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture (Stanford: Hoover 
Institutions Press, 2000), 179. 
9 Stuart J. Kaufman, "Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova's Civil War," 
International Security, volume 21, issue 2 (Autumn, 1996), 119. 
10 Charles King, The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture (Stanford: Hoover 
Institutions Press, 2000), 185. See also Table nr. 1 in Chapter II.  
5 
Empire. Subsequently, in 1917 the region's authority took advantage of the Russian 
revolution accompanied by civil war and reunited with Romania. However, the recovered 
Soviet state managed to gain control of Bessarabia through the 1939 Ribbentrop - 
Molotov Pact.11 Eventually, in 1941 the Romanian troops in alliance with Nazi Germany 
exercised the power over that region. Finally, after the Second World War, the Soviet 
Union had an indisputable monopoly over the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic 
(Bessarabia) until 1991.  
Thus, Russia (Soviet Union) and Romania (previously the Ottoman Empire) 
exercised extensive influence over that region. As a result, those processes created a 
xenophobic atmosphere in Transdniestria and in some parts of the Republic of Moldova. 
The historical memory also produced a polarization in society, which could have led to 
the state's partition. Therefore, the main causes of the conflict also lay in long-standing 
external influence over that region and not only in internal ethnic disputes. 
In fact, the Republic of Moldova after becoming independent proclaimed a policy 
of permanent neutrality in 1991, which excludes, as a matter of principle, participation in 
any military alliances or organizations as well as foreign troops being on Moldovan 
territory.12 However, in 1992 military conflict in the eastern part of the Republic of 
Moldova created a dilemma for the government: to start integration into European 
structures (similar to the foreign policies of Hungary, Romania, Slovenia, and Bulgaria) 
or to integrate into the Commonwealth of Independent States, dominated by the Russian 
Federation.13 Strategically, the former one implies losing the Transdniestrian region 
while the latter one means overcoming the internal conflict by moving into the Russian 
political orbit. Neither of these options seems acceptable, despite the fact that the 
Republic of Moldova has been trying to promote a foreign policy of permanent neutrality. 
Such a policy stopped the 1992 military actions but has not solved the political element 
of the conflict. Furthermore, the conflict only reduces foreign investment and, in the 
                                                 
11 A Pact dividing influence in Eastern and Central Europe between the Soviet Union and Nazi 
Germany, presumed the partition of Poland and the annexation of the Baltic States, Bessarabia, part of 
Finland to the Soviet Union. 
12 It is stipulated in Art.11 of the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova adopted in 1994, with 
amendments of July 5, 2000. 
13 CIS – Commonwealth Independent States organization established after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union and includes 12 Former Soviet Union Republics. 
6 
context of globalization, leads toward a deeper economic crisis. Therefore, the current 
situation deepens the secessionist mood in Transdniestria and affects the Republic of 
Moldova's development as a newly independent state. 
Resolving the Transdniestrian conflict is important for several reasons. First, its 
reignition can harm the civilian population. Second, it can affect not only neighboring 
states but also Russia and other states by creating an influx of refugees. Third, it can 
destabilize the regional security. In fact, the reignition of the conflict can potentially 
destabilize the security in the region due to several reasons: 
• There is 40,000 tons of stocks and munitions, belonging to the Russian 
Federation, that are difficult to withdraw and which must be neutralized in that zone; the 
destabilization of the region can lead to illegal capturing and smuggling of those stocks; 
consequently, that may spark widespread organized crime;14 
• There are no existing guarantees from any states or international 
organizations for the security of the Republic of Moldova, in spite of the declared 
permanent neutrality policy. 
The latter point is a serious concern for the Transdniestrian authorities who view their 
future under the traditional protection of Great Russia or Slavic Brotherhood in contrast 
to the remaining part of the Republic of Moldova, which has been affected by the 
memory of the 1939 Hitler-Stalin Pact. Thus, the conflict resolution also will depend on 
external influences and not only on internal agreement. Even if an internal agreement is 
signed, it will be vulnerable due to the isolated geographic location and weak state 
capacity of the Republic of Moldova to resist economic or political pressure from 
neighboring states and Russia. 
To solve the Transdniestrian conflict in the Republic of Moldova, this thesis 
analyzes the possibility of creating regional complex interdependence around the 
Republic of Moldova. That resolution basically interconnects the countries interested in 
this geo-political region: Romania, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine. This proposal is 
                                                 
14 Project "Military Aspects of Conflict Solution in the East Zone of the Republic of Moldova," 
Publications, Institute for Public Science (Republic of Moldova) <http://www.ipp.md/publications> (11 
August 2002). (Romanian) (Translation by author.) 
7 
based on the complex interdependence theory of the international relations’ neo-
liberalism paradigm. This theory presumes external-internal interactions by involving 
actors other than governments in multiple channels of cooperation. In fact, complex 
interdependence is characterized by multiple channels of connections between countries, 
multiple issues on interstate agendas, and the low likelihood of use of military force 
toward other governments.15 Complex interdependence also draws the new distinction in 
world policy between dependence and interdependence. The former traditionally implied 
a state of being determined or significantly affected by external forces, while the latter 
implies situations characterized by reciprocal effects among countries having joint gains 
and losses, by having domestic and foreign policy closely linked, and by recognition that 
each state's security is interconnected with that of the others.16 Consequently, the 
proposed resolution also would be an input in the entire configuration of the European 
security.  
Historically, states have made several attempts to build a cooperative 
international/regional collective security system: the European Concert, the League of 
Nations, the United Nations (UN), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE). Regrettably, none of the present-day security organizations could have 
intervened in the many regional conflicts that arose after the Soviet Union crumbled. That 
was seen in the Republic of Moldova in 1992 as well. In contrast, the West-European 
cooperative system, which is a combination of interdependent political, economical and 
military tools, has established capabilities to manage its security issues adequately. That 
system demonstrates the working of complex interdependence theory in Western Europe. 
Meanwhile, it is far from the Republic of Moldova’s Eastern conflict region. 
History demonstrates how interested states indirectly as well as directly support 
“allied” sides in international conflicts: Turkey and Greece in Cyprus, India and Pakistan 
in Kashmir, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Russia in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. In fact, several international relations schools have been trying to explain 
various security dilemmas, including conflicts such as in the Republic of Moldova. 
                                                 
15 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition 
(Harvard: Little, Brown and Company, 1977), 25. 
16 Ibid, 8-11. 
8 
Specifically, realism (the traditional approach), presuming the centrality of power and 
interest, views international relations as a continuing struggle of the nation states, the 
main actors of the anarchical international system. According to the realist paradigm, "the 
integration of nations is often talked about, but … seldom takes place."17 The realists 
state that such situations occur because of the limits of cooperation in an anarchical 
system in which states worry about the balance of power. Therefore, the modern world 
structure presumes the domination of dependence over interdependence. However, the 
smaller "states [such as the Republic of Moldova] do not willingly place themselves in 
the situation of increased dependency."18 If the internal Moldovan conflict is solved on 
Transdniestrian conditions, the new situation will make the Republic of Moldova 
completely dependent on the Russian Federation. In such a scenario, the other interested 
states, Ukraine and Romania, will "seek to control what they depend on or to lessen the 
extent of their dependency."19 Thus, applying the balance of power theory to solve the 
Transdniestrian conflict will eventually bring the Republic of Moldova under the major 
control of the Russian Federation; consequently, the other interested actors will assume 
the opposite role, which may destabilize the region. As a result, neither the security of the 
Republic of Moldova nor the Transdniestrian conflict will be solved.  
In contrast, liberalism implies the growing role of non-state actors, such as 
international organizations and non-governmental structures; and constructivism 
emphasizes the socially constructed nature of security relations and states that events can 
be changed through social engineering that alters how people think and act. The solution 
for the Transdniestrian conflict proposed here would be to apply the neo-liberalist and 
constructivist approaches in the form of regional complex interdependence, which can 
guarantee security protection even to small states like Moldova (similar to the case of 
Luxembourg). That approach presumes the need to develop a long-standing solution, 
which will involve new actors and create a complex interstate interdependence among the 
Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, and Ukraine. For example, the 
proposed regional complex interdependence presumes steps such as creating a regional 
                                                 
17 Kenneth N. Waltz, "Anarchic Orders and Balance of Power," in Neo-realism and Its Critics, ed. 
Robert O. Keohane (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 101. 
18 Ibid, 104. 
19 Ibid, 103. 
9 
quadripartite economical free trade zone, interconnected transgovernmental and non-
governmental organizations, and quadripartite military cooperation in humanitarian, anti-
terrorist, and stability operations (including common military exercises). States will be 
interested in such cooperation since it can connect Russian with South-Eastern European 
markets and enhance all aspects of security. Furthermore, the benefits of these 
engagements will be mutual. The new interdependence will eventually create new norms 
and principles of the regional regime. Because "changes in principles and norms are 
changes of the regime [in the region] itself,"20 the attitude of the main regional actors 
toward Moldova and conflict will change. Therefore, to continue the conflict will be 
irrelevant. Thus, the argument of the proposed transformation is that creating complex 
regional interdependence will strengthen the internal agreement between the central 
Moldovan and Transdniestrian authorities; create new norms and principles of the 
complex political, economic and security interdependent regime; and in the long run 
eliminate the reappearance of the conditions for the Transdniestrian conflict in the future. 
Furthermore, it will promote stability in Eastern Europe. 
 
B. ORGANIZATION 
Chapter II discusses the development of the Transdniestrian conflict in the 
Republic of Moldova employing the structural/cultural approach of comparative politics 
and the traditional (realist) approach of the international relations theory. The main focus 
is the hidden reasons for the conflict, including the contradictionary empirical facts, 
different states' interests, and political backlash of the different political cultures in the 
new independent state – the Republic of Moldova. The conclusion of the chapter suggests 
the additional need for external approaches. Even if an internal agreement is signed, it 
will be very vulnerable due to the Republic of Moldova’s dependence on its neighbors 
and Russia. 
Chapter III analyzes the conflict resolution process. The chapter shows that 
mainly the conflict resolution process has reflected the cold war mentality and the 
traditional realist approach. This chapter demonstrates that even though conflict 
resolution has been an internal matter, external factors will play a major role in the final 
                                                 
20 Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regime as Intervening 
Variables," in International Regimes, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (Cornell University Press, 1983), 4. 
10 
result of the political agreement.  The internal agreement should be a basis for resolution. 
However, resolving the conflict would always be fragile because of the opposing views 
of the external states around the Republic of Moldova. Even if the internal agreement is 
reached satisfying Transdniestrian leaders, the Republic of Moldova will always be 
dependent on the commitment to the East in the current regional order. The more 
Moldova tries to shift foreign policy westward, the more the Transdniestrian problem will 
be heard again. Thus, the stability in the Republic of Moldova, which has a vulnerable 
geographical location and a limited state capacity, will depend on cautious Moldovan 
foreign policy and interactions between Romania, Ukraine, and most importantly the 
Russian Federation. Therefore, in addition to the internal agreement, an external one 
should be negotiated for the purpose of strengthening the peace settlement. The external 
agreement should avoid the past mistakes and interconnect the external players with the 
support of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the United 
States of America, and the European Union (EU). 
In this context, Chapter IV introduces conventional external approaches. First, it 
demonstrates the limitations of the realist theory for conflict resolution due to the limits 
of cooperation of the nation states in the international system. That approach can only 
polarize the society and lead to state partition in the future. In the meantime, the liberalist 
and constructivist approaches (international organizations as mediators) have more 
advantages, but their recent applications have not brought fruitful results in the peace 
process of the Transdniestrian conflict nor in Cyprus, Kashmir, or Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Practically, the chapter asserts that the participation of the Republic of 
Moldova (neutral country) in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS); Georgia, 
Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova Cooperative Initiative (GUUAM); North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) “Partnership for Peace” program, and the South-
Eastern European Stability Pact alongside with the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe's efforts are insufficient to resolve the Transdniestrian conflict.21 
That policy does not eliminate the key causes of the conflict: the dispute between the 
government of Moldova and Transdniestria's leadership and most importantly the 
                                                 
21 GUUAM – Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova cooperative initiative around 
Black Sea. Southeastern European Stability Pact – Pact adopted in 1999 directed mostly to promote peace, 
trust, and stability in Balkans and Southeastern part of Europe. 
11 
external conflicting interests of the states interested in the region around the Republic of 
Moldova. In contrast, Chapter IV demonstrates the potential applicability of the complex 
interdependence theory in that geo-political region. Therefore, the conclusion of the 
chapter is based on the argument that developing the complex interdependence between 
the Republic of Moldova and the interested neighboring states will solve the 
Transdniestrian conflict in the long run. The interdependence can establish strong links at 
all interstate levels and potentially change the regional regime.   
Therefore, regional complex interdependence would be applicable to the Republic 
of Moldova presuming a deeper connection with Romania, Russia, and Ukraine along 
with the United States of America and the European Union's support. The main 
characteristic of the solution is that complex interdependence will involve the interaction 
of not only state but also non-state actors, including international organizations. That 
process would eliminate the suspiciousness of the conflicting parties. Furthermore, such a 
proposal will not require Moldova to abandon its declared neutrality. The new policy can 
be viewed as cooperative neutrality with military non-alignment in a complex 
interdependent environment. The argument of the proposed transformation is that new 
norms and principles of the complex political, economic and security interdependent 
regime will positively influence the solution of the Transdniestrian conflict in the 
Republic of Moldova.  
The conclusion summarizes why an external - approach formula will be a key to 
the Transdniestrian conflict, eliminating tensions in that region. In fact, the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe as a neutral party have been being a legal 
umbrella for mediation since all parties consider it as the most appropriate organization 
for negotiations. Therefore, recommendations will be provided for the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, for the authorities of the Republic of Moldova, 
guarantor-states of the peace negotiations, and Romania as well. Nevertheless, the 
significant factor in creating such an arrangement should be the role of the United States 
of America and the European Union to balance the asymmetrical powerful influence of 
Russia in that region. The US and the EU influence will ensure that all countries 
interested in the Republic of Moldova will achieve equal political and economic 
representations in the proposed complex interdependence. Correspondingly, when the 
12 
norms and principles of the regional political, economic and security regime eventually 





II. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
TRANSDNIESTRIAN CONFLICT 
The annexation of Bessarabia was a great advantage to us [Russia]. It 
brought us closer to the Balkans, gave us the power to consolidate a 
foothold on the Danube and to prepare ourselves for a later advance at the 
expenses of the Turkish Empire, thus carrying out the policy of Catherine 
II. 
                                    – Russian Ministry of Education (after 1812)22 
Annexation of Bessarabia [from Romania in 1939] by USSR was a crime 
without any historical or judicial justification. Such practices of the big 
empires left bitterness in the minds of Romanians. 
  – Ion Iliescu, President of Romania (July 24, 2002)23 
In that time [1991-1992], when 'Moldova was ready to re-join Romania', 
Smirnov [head of Transdniestria] and his team found the courage to resist 
the policy of Chisinau [capital of the Republic of Moldova]. 
 – Ghenadii Selezniov, Chairman of the State Duma [Parliament]  
                                      of the Russian Federation (October 22, 2002)24 
Generally, the conventional wisdom about modern internal conflicts after the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union and Federal Republic of Yugoslavia suggests that they 
were ignited due to the collapse of a central authority releasing old-forgotten nationalism. 
However, the ethnic component of the Transdniestrian region (table 1) clearly 
demonstrates that almost 40 percent of the populations of that region were 
Moldovans/Romanians. According to Matthew Evangelista, this fact suggests that the 
conflict is more a case of civil war/separatism than an ethnic clash, while authorities of 
Transdniestria "dominated by 'Russians filled with Soviet nostalgia'" strived to present it 
as an ethnic conflict.25 For instance, the President of the self-declared Transdniestrian 
                                                 
22 Nicolas Dima, Bessarabia and Bukovina (Eastern European Monographs, Boulder: Columbia 
University Press, 1982), 13.  
23 Flux, "President of Romania, Ion Iliescu, Declared, in Moscow, That Annexation of Bessarabia by 
the USSR Was a Historical Crime," MOLDOVA AZI  <http://www.azi.md/print/20018/Ro> (24 July 2002). 
(Romanian) (Translation by author.) 
24 "Russian Federation Oversight the Sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova," Reporter-MD (2001)    
<http://www.reporter_md.htm>  (22 October 2002). (Russian) (Translation by author.) 
25 Matthew Evangelista, "Historical Legacies and the Politics of Intervention in the Former Soviet 
Union," in The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, ed. Michael E. Brown (Center for Science 
and International Affairs John F. Kennedy School of Government Harvard University, 1996), 114. 
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Moldovan Republic, Igor Nicolaevichi Smirnov, views the conflict even as a Moldovan 
aggression.26 That point of view has dominated Transdniestrian political agenda and the 
mass media since the outbreak of conflict. However, according to Matthew Evangelista: 
there are actually more Russians and Ukrainians living in Moldova proper 
than in the secessionist region [Transdniestria]. They have not supported 
the secession; nor, by and large, has the Moldovan government mistreated 
them. The Dniestr Republic government, by contrast, has violated the 
rights of ethnic Moldovans in the region … the conflict in Moldova is not 
strictly or even essentially an interethnic one – indeed, both sides deny 
that it is.27 
Table 1.   Population of Transdniestria, from 1897 to 198928 
 
 1936 1989 
Moldovans 122,683 41.8 % 239,936 39.9 % 
Ukrainians 84,293 28.7 170,079 28.3 
Russians  41,794 14.2 153,393 25.5 
Jews 23,158 7.9 - - 
Other  21,873 7.4 38,252 6.4 
Total 271,928 100.0 601,660 100.0 
 
In this context, to demonstrate the origins and development of the Transdniestrian 
conflict, the first part of the chapter will empirically examine nation-state formation of 
the current Republic of Moldova and Transdniestria, which have been in the crossroads 
of the historical geopolitical struggle of the bigger states around that region. This chapter 
will demonstrate that the driving causes of the conflict over Moldova were also the Soviet 
(previously the Russian Empire) drive for influence in the Balkans, and Romania's 
attempts to win back historical (lost) territories. Both sides strived by different means to 
accomplish their goals by using rhetoric about Romanian/Moldovan and Russian (Soviet) 
                                                 
26 Igor Smirnov, "Their Situation Improving by Taking Advantage of Us Will Not Happened," Official 
Site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic, 12 <http://www.mfa-
pmr.idknet.com/smi/index/php?lang=rus&options=1&id=0&next=1> (29 July 2002). (Russian); also see on 
this site the "General Information" compartment, where the military conflict of 1992 is defined as a "The 
result of the policy of genocide, carried out by the Republic of Moldova, was the full-scale military 
aggression of Moldova against Pridnestrovie [Transdniestria in Russian]." (Translation by author.) 
27 Matthew Evangelista, "Historical Legacies and the Politics of Intervention in the Former Soviet 
Union," in The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict, ed. Michael E. Brown (Center for Science 
and International Affairs John F. Kennedy School of Government Harvard University, 1996), 113. 
28 Charles King, The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture (Stanford: Hoover 
Institutions Press, 2000), 185. 
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identities and languages, and artificially created the MASSR (future Transdniestrian 
Moldovan Republic). Finally, the struggle resulted in the Transdniestrian conflict. 
The second part of the chapter demonstrates that the toppling of the Soviet Union 
was only an intervening spark for the conflict. It demonstrates: a national Moldovan 
awakening; the Transdniestrian elite's (who were privileged in the Soviet era) antagonism 
toward the new emerging Moldovan elite; a failed Transdniestrian attempt to repeat the 
historical path of the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (1924) by 
creating a Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic; and external factors that significantly 
supported the military actions and political confrontation.  This section argues that by de 
facto forming the Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic, the external actors achieved their 
objective of not permitting the unification of Bessarabia with Romania, which was 
widely perceived as Moldova's goal in Russia and Ukraine. The chapter concludes that 
unless the triangle of Russia-Romania-Ukraine (the states in territorial proximity) is 
connected in a complex interdependence, the internal conflict resolution will always be 
vulnerable. 
A. HISTORICAL GEO-POLITICAL CONTRADICTIONS AS SOURCES OF 
THE CONFLICT 
The Republic of Moldova, located in the Southeastern part of Europe between 
Romania in the West and Ukraine in East, was known historically as Bessarabia and then 
the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR), which was created in 1940 as a 
consequence of the 1939 Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact.29 It is composed of Bessarabia, the 
eastern part of the historical Moldova principality (formerly in the eastern part of 
Romania), and a part of the former Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic 
(MASSR), which was artificially created by the Soviet Union in 1924 to facilitate the 
penetration of Soviet propaganda into the Kingdom of Romania and a territorial claim 
toward  Romania  (for Bessarabia).30 Territorial  disputes  in  the  search  for  spheres  of 
                                                 
29 Anthony Read and David Fisher, The Deadly Embrace: Hitler, Stalin and the Nazi-Soviet Pact 
1939-1941 (New York/ London: Norton & Company), 471-473. 
30 Charles King, The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture (Stanford: Hoover 
Institutions Press, 2000), 63. 
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influence over historical Moldova and the current Republic of Moldova have continued 
for centuries: initially by the Ottoman Empire, later on between Russia (including the 
Soviet Union) and Romania. 
The Republic of Moldova (former MSSR) proclaimed independence on August 
27, 1991. Unfortunately, developing and consolidating the new state has not been smooth 
due to historical contradictions in the state and national identity formation, which have 
constantly been impacted by external factors. Historically, larger states' clashes over the 
region left a bitter legacy in the population of the Republic of Moldova (including 
Transdniestria) creating a polarized xenophobic mood. The latter factor became the 
weapon of the political elites within the Republic of Moldova and Transdniestria to 
accomplish their political goals, which were the intervening causes in the conflict.31 This 
chapter argues that the driving causes of the conflict over Moldova were also the Soviet 
(previously the Russian Empire) drive for the influence in the Balkans, and Romania's 
attempts to win back historical territories. Both sides strived by different means to 
accomplish their goals by using rhetoric about Romanian/Moldovan and Russian (Soviet) 
identities and languages, and artificially created the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet 
Socialist Republic (MASSR – future Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic). Finally, the 
struggle resulted in the Transdniestrian conflict. 
1. External Influences in State and Nation Formation (Origins)  
The nation state was the secular organization of the nation's power, 
declared Max Weber … The people are identical with the nation, which 
sees itself not just as a cultural, but also a political entity. The nation as 
constituted by the people finds and evolves its identity within the state; it 
is in the context of the nation state that a people is free to govern itself, 
free from alien rule.32 
 The nation formation in the Republic of Moldova (Bessarabia and Transdniestria) 
was historically impacted by several foreign dominations, most recently Russian, which 
affected the nation-consciousness, language, religion, and identity. Transdniestria (which 
had been under the dominance of the Russian Empire even longer) along with certain 
national policies in Bessarabia (MSSR) have been regularly used as a check - and - 
                                                 
31 Stuart J. Kaufman, "Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova's Civil War," 
International Security, volume 21, issue 2 (Autumn, 1996), 120. 
32 Hagen Schulze, States, Nations and Nationalism (Blackwell Publisher, 1996), 197. 
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balance mechanism against the possible unification of Bessarabia with Romania. Thus, 
the externally impacted nation formation in the Republic of Moldova proved to be the 
state's vulnerability, which was used in the Transdniestrian conflict in 1992. That factor 
can be also used as a continuing external influence in the Republic of Moldova, which 
has a limited capacity to counter its neighbors and Russia. 
Generally, European states have undergone different state and nation formations. 
However, the main distinction is between political nation states and cultural nation states. 
As Hagen Schulze, a German Professor, summarized: "In that sense it might well be said 
that, in France, it was the state that gave birth to the nation."33 At the same time, he also 
concluded that "formation of a common British identity was not rooted in the counties 
alone: cultural integration proceeded hand in hand with political integration of the 
state."34 Hence, in France and Britain nations were forged by the state, creating political 
nation-states. In contrast, emerging ethnic nations, living in three big multinational 
empires, facilitated state formation in Central-Eastern Europe. Therefore, the national-
liberation struggle and cultural nationalism became causes for the cultural-nation state 
formation, including the unification of Wallachia and historical Moldova, which existed 
from 1340 until 1866. Having the same origins and cultural similarities (including one 
language and the dominant Orthodox religion), they joined to form modern Romania in 
1866.35 Nevertheless, until that time, the region had been a focal point of clashes 
between three empires: Ottoman Turkey, Austria-Hungary, and Russia, which would 
affect future nation-state formations of many states, including Moldova (Bessarabia) and 
Romania. 
After the long Ottoman domination of Moldova, during the Russo-Turkish War 
from 1806 to 1812, the Moldovan principality would itself come under direct Russian 
control, another shifting external impact on the state and nation formation.36 Ironically, 
later the control over the Danube and Dniestr Rivers would become a Russian strategic 
                                                 
33 Hagen Schulze, States, Nations and Nationalism (Blackwell Publisher, 1996), 103. 
34 Ibid, 123. 
35 Ivan T. Berend, Decades of Crisis: Central and Eastern Europe before World War II (Berkeley and 
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998), 53. 
36 Charles King, The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture (Stanford: Hoover 
Institutions Press, 2000), 15. 
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goal, which most of the European countries would worry about during the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries. As a consequence, in 1812, fearing deteriorated Franco-Russian 
relations, "Russia hurriedly concluded the Bucharest Treaty with Turkey managing to 
annex the eastern half of the Principality of Moldova (Bessarabia). The Russians argued 
that Bessarabia was still different from Moldova …."37 However, the appeal issued by 
the de jure recognized nation-state of all Romanians, the Kingdom of Romania, in 1878 
for the unification of all Romanians, including Bessarabia, forced the Russian Empire to 
apply stricter control and influence over the population of Bessarabia in order to uphold 
its strategic ground at the Danube River.38 As a result, that was perhaps the most radical 
external impact on the state and nation formations of Bessarabia, the future Republic of 
Moldova. From then on, the Russian authorities would never consider any possibilities of 
losing that territory and would apply all means to incorporate that region in the Russian 
Empire and later the Soviet Union. That factor left the population bitter over the future 
Romania that considered that part of the land their historical territory. 
In summary, the initial stage of the Romanian nation-state formation shows that 
the majority of Romanians (Moldovans and Wallachians) had a common religion, 
Romanian identity, and language (1825), which culminated in the union of the two 
principalities from 1859 to 1861. Thereafter, however, the population of Bessarabia went 
on a historical detour, which was affected until 1991 by the struggle between Russia 
(Soviet Union) and Romania for Bessarabia (MSSR), when Transdniestria was used as a 
psychological check factor.  
a. Reunion with Romania in 1918 and the Transdniestrian Factor 
           The collapse of the Russian Empire and the First World War's geo-political 
results radically changed the fate of Bessarabia, resulting in unification with Romania in 
1918. However, that unification was not a welcome outcome for Bessarabians but rather 
the need for a land of limited capabilities to choose the least bad alternative and to shed 
                                                 
37 Nicolas Dima, Bessarabia and Bukovina (Eastern European Monographs, Boulder: Columbia 
University Press, 1982), 13. 
38 Charles King, The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture (Stanford: Hoover 
Institutions Press, 2000), 25. First, the distinct Bessarabia's autonomous church was fully subordinated to 
Moscow. The constitution of Bessarabia (1818) was abandon making the region another Russian province 
(guberniia; 1871). The use of the Moldovan language was abandoned in school and public life and was 
accompanied by prohibiting Romanian books. Transdniestria began such a process even earlier. 
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the previous harsh Russian management.39 This would eventually contribute toward 
revision of such a situation not only by the great powers but also by the local population 
because of two reasons: first, for Bessarabia the time spent in the Russian Empire meant 
it did not have a strong Romanian spirit; second, it became a multi-national land. 
Furthermore, again the strategic games of the Realpolitik between the major powers 
would be the main causes for Soviet struggle for reannexation of Bessarabia. 
According to Nicolas Dima, for Russia, losing Bessarabia was seen as a 
defeat and a strategic loss. Ironically, a large Moldovan population remained at the other 
part of the Dniestr River, which would be manipulated later by Moscow to 
psychologically impact the Romanian authority:  
The Moldavian ASSR [i.e., the future Transdniestria!] [was] created [in 
1924] along the boundaries of Romania to induce Moldavians in eastern 
Romania to agitate for incorporation into the Soviet Union. The same 
technique was used by Moscow in many other cases, notably the now 
disbanded Karelo-Finnish republic in the north and the Tadzhik republic in 
Central Asia [Buriat-Mongol autonomous republic in East]. Referring to 
the Soviet intentions of the time, an American diplomat wrote in 1924 
that: 'It is apparently not the intention of the Bolsheviks to try to recover 
Bessarabia by force of arms, but rather to keep Romania in a nervous 
state….'40 
Finally, the economic depression, growing Romanian national fascism, and most 
important, the Romanian political mistakes toward the Bessarabian population, the mirror 
image of the previously Russian policy, would favor the Soviet policy attempts.41 
b. The 1939 Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact and the Fate of Bessarabia 
The Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact as well as the 1918 unification of 
Bessarabia and Romania became the main tools of the political elites of Moldova and 
Transdniestria to mobilize the civilian masses. Specifically, the MSSR began boiling 
                                                 
39 Nicolas Dima, Bessarabia and Bukovina (Eastern European Monographs, Boulder: Columbia 
University Press, 1982), 16. 
40 Nicolas Dima, Bessarabia and Bukovina (Eastern European Monographs, Boulder: Columbia 
University Press, 1982), 23. 
41 Charles King, The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture (Stanford: Hoover 
Institutions Press, 2000), 42-48. Russian teachers and public workers were purged; Russian and Ukrainian 
schools and churches were closed; the Russian Julian religious calendar and Cyrillic alphabet of the 
language abandoned. Additionally, Bessarabian politicians (elite) found life in Greater Romania far less 
welcoming than they expected. 
20 
after discovering that the so-called non-aggression Pact between Stalin and Hitler, signed 
by Ribbentrop and Molotov in Moscow on August 23, 1939, had a secret protocol 
defining spheres of influence in Central-Eastern Europe, including Bessarabia, without 
any plebiscite – the famous Soviet demand toward Romania regarding Bessarabia.42  
That fact created an incentive for Romania to became allied with Nazi 
Germany to take back Bessarabia. Indeed, German strategists, according to Dima, who 
"advised Romania to yield to Moscow's demands for it would settle the matter later," had 
wisely calculated such a step.43     
c. The Impact of the Second World War and Holocaust in Romania 
on Bessarabia and Transdniestria 
The incorporation of Bessarabia in June 1940 into the Soviet Union was 
not a desired act for most Moldovans but rather an expectation of something new and 
better than in Romania because of the dissatisfaction with the discriminatory policy from 
Bucharest. However, the expected improvement was impeded by two factors: full 
Romanian participation in operation Barbarossa and the Holocaust in Romania – other 
external causes, which would leave a psychological trauma on the older population of 
Bessarabia and especially Transdniestria.44 As a result of such events, three factors 
would became crucial in developing the future MSSR: the Moldovans/Romanians of 
Bessarabia would be considered unreliable citizens of the Soviet Union (allies of Fascist 
Romania), the Transdniestrians would on the contrary play the key role in the life of the 
future Republic (MSSR), and the policy of the Soviet Union would result in significant 
purges of Moldovans and Romanians. Eventually, Transdniestrian elite to mobilize the 
population during the 1992 conflict used that historical factor (memory) extensively. 
 
 
                                                 
42 Anthony Read and David Fisher, The Deadly Embrace: Hitler, Stalin and the Nazi-Soviet Pact 
1939-1941 (New York/ London: Norton & Company), 254. 
43 Nicolas Dima, Bessarabia and Bukovina (Eastern European Monographs, Boulder: Columbia 
University Press, 1982), 27. 
44 Radu Ioanid, The Holocaust in Romania: The Destruction of Jews and Gypsies under the Antonescu 
Regime, 1940-1944 (Chicago: Ivan R Dee, 2000), 289. More than 45, 000 Jews – probably closer to 60,000 
– were killed in Bessarabia and Bukovina by Romanian and German troops in 1941. At least 75,000 
deported Romanian Jews died as a result of the expulsion to Transdniestria. 
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d. The 1940 to 1991 Soviet Policy Impact 
The Soviet period reflected the old-fashioned Russian goal of dominance 
over the occupied territory with one addition: the policy was amplified by Communist 
ideology directed toward Soviet nation building, full secularization, repression, and 
"Russification." Furthermore, the Soviet policy would be brutally directed toward 
completely eliminating Romanian ties and Sovietizing the region. As Nicolas Dima 
concluded:  
Hundreds of thousands of Russians, Ukrainians, and others poured into 
Moldavia demonstrating that the Soviet goal was not economic 
[deportation of healthy Moldovan labor contradicts such a statement], but 
political, namely denationalization and russification. Dispersing and 
mixing various ethnic groups has been the Russian way of domination and 
assimilation ever since the beginning of Moscow's expansion.45  
As a result, the artificial nation building of the new Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic 
(Bessarabia and Transdniestria) would be fatally impeded and later would produce the 
tensions between two historical sub-regions. Those tensions, especially regarding 
language and identity, would also be used by external and internal forces to manipulate 
the Transdniestrian conflict in the region. The reason would again become traditional 
external geo-political tensions between Moscow and Bucharest about rights on historical 
territory. 
Initially, the policy of the Soviet Union after the annexation of Bessarabia 
in 1940 was directed toward the forceful industrialization, collectivization, and 
liquidation of the "exploiting class" (the MASSR [Transdniestria] had experienced it 
since 1924): "over 13,000 Soviet specialists and party activists were assigned to 
Moldavia and most of them came from Russia, the Ukraine and Byelorussia."46 The 
situation was worsened by the general reluctant attitude of the Romanian/Moldovan 
majority to cooperate with Soviet authorities regarding reforms.47 According to findings 
of Nicolas Dima,  
                                                 
45 Nicolas Dima, Bessarabia and Bukovina (Eastern European Monographs, Boulder: Columbia 
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46 Nicolas Dima, Bessarabia and Bukovina (Eastern European Monographs, Boulder: Columbia 
University Press, 1982), 43. 
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22 
from July 1940 until June 1941 the Soviet authorities carried out massive 
arrests and deportations, particularly along the new Romanian border, 
coupled with countless summary executions. [According to one refugee] 
prior to imminent outbreak of war, the Soviets deported some 150,000 
people from Bessarabia and Bukovina to Siberia and Central Asia.48  
After the war, the Soviets, facing the population challenges, secretly 
prepared and conducted on the territory of the new Republic operation South for the final 
liquidation of the anti-Soviet and "capitalist" (hostile) elements.49 As a result of that 
operation, 42,975 people were permanently deported to Siberia and Kazakhstan.50 That 
was not the only aspect of the Soviet Communist strategy toward the new republic; 
secularization and repression were the other techniques of the Communists in Moldavia. 
In Moldavia, Communist secularization was amplified by the traditional 
struggle between the Moscow and Bucharest Eparchies about religious dominance in 
Bessarabia. Therefore, the liquidation of religion in Moldavia carried the further goal of 
wiping out the Romanian past.51 The most famous example was the Soviet secret 
operation North conducted on April 1, 1951, which was directed against the Romanian 
Orthodox, Catholic, and Protestant religions in Moldavia. In the operation, 2,617 
religious people were deported from Moldavia, and many churches and prayer houses 
were destroyed.52 Such policies left bitterness and amplified the antagonism between the 
Romanian and Russian Eparchies. 
Additionally, the Soviet authorities realized that on the territory of 
Bessarabia they faced not only resistance to communist reform but also resistance to 
national integration into the new type of Soviet people identity (internationalized, but 
presumably Russified due to the majority of the Russian nation). The first step was 
language reform, which consisted of transforming the Romanian language with a Latin 
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alphabet into Moldovan with a Cyrillic alphabet. According to Nicolas Dima: "500 
teachers from Russia and 380 from the Ukraine and Byelorussia were brought in a hurry 
in September 1940. They actually started the russfication of public education … designed 
to weaken the Romanian ethnic character of Moldavia."53 That technique had already 
been successfully conducted in the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic 
(Transdniestria) since 1924. As a second step, Russian was introduced as the official 
language, which made the Romanian/Moldovan language useless, forcing the children to 
study Russian. Later, that would produce the antagonism between Moldovans and other 
nationalities. Furthermore, the Soviet government implemented a theory about the 
Moldovan identity, which was, according to Soviet historians, different from Romanian. 
According to such falsified history, Romanians/Moldovans were taught that they were 
south Slavic people different from Romania and the Moldavian language was a south 
dialect of the Slavic language.54 The theory had a problem because over the Prut River 
lived Romanians who also called themselves Moldovans because they lived in the 
historical principality Moldova. Additionally, the same heroes were heroes of both 
Romanians and Moldovans along the Prut River. All of that antagonized the relations 
between the USSR and Communist Romania. 
The Romanian authority, according to Nicolas Dima, never lost sight of 
Bessarabia at that time and did everything possible to sustain the Romanian spirit among 
the Moldovans: 
Romania replaced the old 50 kilowatt radio transmitter of Iasi, the capital 
of historical Moldova located a few miles from the Soviet Moldavia, with 
a 1,000 kilowatt transmitter. The new radio stations heard now at a great 
distance broadcast primarily programs about Romanian culture, history, 
and literature and reminds the Soviet Romanians [Bessarabians] that they 
are not forgotten.55 
Bucharest actively promoted the policy of cultural exchanges (theater, arts) striving to 
sustain in the Moldavian population a feeling of national pride of Romania. As a result, 
by 1970 the new Moldovans began nationally to awaken (the previous Bessarabian 
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intelligentsia had fled the country or been purged) and claim more openly their truly 
Romanian identity. That was accompanied by growing local antagonism toward Moscow. 
For instance, 
in fall of 1970 on the sidewalks and the huge windows of the Kishinev 
(Chisinau) Press House, as well as the walls of the University, Interior 
Ministry, and nr.1 High School of Kishinev, were painted big lettered 
slogans such as 'Russian go home,' 'Moldavia for Moldavians', and 'We 
want to be with Romania.'56 
Thus, the antagonism between Moscow and Bucharest never pacified over the 
Bessarabian question during the twentieth century.  
In short, after World War II, the tragic development of that region was 
shaped by two external actors: Russia, later USSR, and Romania. Particularly, the Soviet 
policy along with the growing new Moldovan elites and national awakening would 
collide with the old xenophobic mood of the Romanian Holocaust, especially in 
Transdniestria, resulting in a conflict at the time of the Soviet collapse. That conflict, 
despite its internal character, would again be employed by external and internal forces for 
attaining their political objectives. The obvious internal tool for such external policy was 
the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, revived as the Transdniestrian 
Moldavian Republic in 1991, which has always had an elite loyal to Moscow, the 
majority being Russian and Ukrainian. 
2. Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (Future 
Transdniestria) – External Tool for Psychological Influence and 
Control in Bessarabia and the MSSR 
The establishment of the MASSR in 1924 served two important ends in 
the emerging foreign policy of the Soviet Union. First, the new republic 
facilitated the penetration of Soviet propaganda into the kingdom of 
Romania … Second, it ensured that the Bessarabian question remained a 
topical issue in international politics and a thorn in the side of Romanian 
politics at the League of Nations.57  
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Thus, a purposely created, artificial Moldovan autonomous republic with a Ukrainian 
majority (50%) served as a foreign policy tool of the Soviet Union. The current 
Transdniestrian elite has been trying to repeat those techniques in almost a mirror way 
since 1990.  











In fact, Transdniestria, in spite of its significant Moldovan population, historically 
has never been a part of Romania or the Moldovan Principality. The Dniestr River was 
the historical demarcation between the Turkish and Russian influence; furthermore, 
historical Moldovan expansion stopped at the Dniestr River. That factor would be 
manipulated by Russia twice during this century while making policy toward Romania 
from 1918 to 1940 and the Republic of Moldova during the Transdniestrian conflict. 
Furthermore, the Transdniestria represented even more multi-national territory than 
Bessarabia. However, the Soviet authorities, despite only 30.3 percent of the population 
being Romanians and Moldovans, decided to establish the new republic as the Moldovan 
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (table 2).    
 The Communist authorities employed different techniques in that republic to 
attain their external goals. First, Moscow implemented a program forging the Moldovan 
language and the truly Moldovan nationality, which would later be used in Bessarabia.59 
Second, they spread propaganda in Bessarabia about the perfect life under communism. 
For example, Charles King points out: "the MASSR authorities even ordered that bright 
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lights be kept perpetually burning in Tiraspol, which looked across the river to the 
Romanian city of Bender, in order to impress upon the Bessarabian peasants the 
advantage of life in the technologically progressive Soviet republic."60 Such techniques 
would be again used from 1991 until the present by the authorities of the declared 
Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic, despite the deepest economic crisis in the region. 
Finally, after the annexation of Bessarabia to the USSR in 1940, the new Moldovan 
Soviet Socialist Republic was created from Bessarabia and raions (Russian county) from 
the MASSR with a high concentration of Moldovans, while others, Ukrainians and 
Russians, were returned to the Ukrainian authority.  
 From that point until the collapse of the Soviet Union, Transdniestria, being 
considered loyal to Moscow, would be in a privileged position and serve as a basis of the 
Communist dominance in the MSSR. All heavy industry has been constructed on the 
territory of the left bank of the Dniestr River. Internal (Soviet) immigrants arrived to 
work in the new factories, increasing the Russian and Ukrainian portions of the 
population, while Moldovan workers were sent to other Soviet industrialized regions. 
Finally, the presence of the Soviet military in that region played the crucial role even 
during the conflict between central Moldovan and the Transdniestrian authorities. Most 
Soviet units and ammunition depots were concentrated in Transdniestria. Only a few 
Moldovan Soviet officers had the luxury to serve in the MSSR. In retrospect, the area 
became a haven (mild climate, low prices, beautiful nature) for retired military personnel 
and their families. Like Belarus and the Ukrainian Crimea, Transdniestria became one of 
the most highly Sovietized territories within the union.  
The primary spiritual loyalty of Transdniestria was not to Russia but to Moscow, 
when it ruled the entire Soviet Union.61 After the disintegration of Communism, 
Transdniestrians declared: "We did not break up with the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union 
broke up with us and dissolved."62 Thus, the population of Transdniestria can be 
considered as a successful experiment of forging a new Soviet identity and loyalty to 
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Moscow. In contrast, by that time, the rest of Moldavia grew a new elite, which started 
awakening regarding their truly Romanian/Moldovan identity. However, the new elite 
and population truly believe that MSSR (including Transdniestria) – the new Republic of 
Moldova – is their motherland and not Romania or historical Moldova. Therefore, by 
1990, a new conflict was already boiling: conflict between elites from the MSSR 
(Bessarabian part) and the privileged elite of Transdniestria, which would employ the 
cultural and linguistic differences as a weapon to attain their objectives. 
Many political specialists, who monitored the situation in the MSSR from outside, 
predicted such development (1982): "It appeared, however, that Moldavian cities are 
rather more Russianized than truly Russified. In the future, they may become the main 
linguistic battlefield between Romanian [Moldovans] and Russian. The linguistic future 
largely depends upon the composition of future urban migrations."63 If a foreign 
specialist was able to make such a prediction then Soviet officials were likely aware of 
that growing peril and had different alternatives to respond. Nowadays, to prove it would 
be difficult since many national archives do not allow research of that period. However, 
frequent visits by Moscow officials, including Russian Vice-president Rutskoi, to 
Tiraspol without acknowledging Chisinau64 and transferring of all KGB files from 
Chisinau to Tiraspol [not to Moscow] in autumn of 1989 suggest indirect Soviet 
involvement in or even active planning of a strategy for the future Transdniestrian 
Moldovan Republic.65    
3. Role of Elites 
The process of the collision of two different elites, pro-Moscow (Transdniestrian) 
and local (nationally awakened), was facilitated when Mikhail Gorbachev announced  
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Glasnost and Perestroika. That reform basically weakened the Communist Party's control 
allowing the local population (elite) to be democratically elected in the Supreme Council 
of the MSSR. 
In fact, after the annexation of Bessarabia to the USSR in 1940, most of the 
Romanian/Moldovan elite immigrated or tragically underwent Soviet repressions and 
deportations. The basis for the new MSSR leadership became the Soviet and loyal elite 
from Transdniestria. Furthermore, another mistake of the Soviet policy was an 
isolationist policy toward the rural majority Moldovan population. According to Suslov, 
the late Kremlin leading ideologist, the Soviet Union in 1980s had three antagonisms: 
"national antagonism, rural-urban antagonism and white-blue collar antagonism."66 
In the Moldavian SSR, various factors amplified all these antagonisms. National 
antagonism was growing naturally as in all parts of the USSR due to the mistaken Soviet 
national policy. This was amplified by the rural-urban antagonism in the MSSR, which 
was characterized by a rural majority Moldovan versus an urban minority Russian-
speaking population (elite factor reflected the same). For instance, Nicolas Dima found: 
"for long the Soviet leaders actually pursued a deliberate policy of isolating the mostly 
rural Moldavians 'from the political and urban-technological order' of their own republic 
dominated by Russians and Ukrainians."67 Third, white-blue collar antagonism also had a 
national color. The ruling Communist Party of Moldova was established in August of 
1940 on the basis of the MASSR (Transdniestria) organization. In fact, the Russians and 
Ukrainians dominated within the party for most of the Soviet period. According to 
Charles King research: "The few Moldovans who found prominent positions in the local 
and central organs were invariably from Transdniestria … rather than from Bessarabia."68 
However, by the 1980s, the new Moldovan elite born after 1940 started to emerge, 
occupying more and more leading positions throughout the MSSR, inevitably leading 
toward conflict among the elites. 
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Thus, by the end of 1990s, in the Republic of Moldova the three antagonisms 
noted by Suslov had taken on a strong national color; most important, the local elite for 
the first time became dominant over the former privileged Transdniestrian elite. Both 
elites recognized the growing national awareness and national antagonism and 
consequently employed these factors as weapons to attain their political objectives, which 
resulted in the military conflict. Even in that situation, the Russian and Romanian 
authorities were also carefully monitoring the situation striving to influence the conflict 
in their favor. 
B. DEMISE OF THE SOVIET UNION – FINAL SPARK FOR THE 
CONFLICT 
This thesis does not analyze the Transdniestrian conflict as ensuing only from 
internal causes but rather in the context of geo-political interests of outside powers. 
However, the internal factors should not be ignored because they have been manipulated 
to attain the political goals of the interested parties in the conflict. Furthermore, the 
Soviet ideology profoundly impacted the new Moldovan identity and people, who truly 
started believing that Transdniestria was part of their state. 
The catalyst for the conflict was again an external factor, the shattering of the 
Soviet Union, which resulted in a temporary regional power vacuum and democratization 
of Moldavian life accompanied by national awakening. At this time, the gravest concern 
of Moscow and Transdniestria was the possibility that historical Bessarabia would rejoin 
Romania. Domestic changes in 1989 in language, identity, and revision of history were 
contributing to such conclusions. However, the subsequent conflict reflected a 
miscalculation by Moscow and the Transdniestrian elite about the dedication of the new 
Moldovan elite and population toward their new motherland, the Republic of Moldova, 
and not Romania, which became friendly but not their political homeland. Therefore, by 
seeking to create a Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic, the external actors achieved their 
objective of not permitting the unification of the Republic of Moldova (Bessarabia) with 
Romania. However, while this was perceived in Russia and Ukraine as a Moldovan goal, 
it was not widely supported in the Republic of Moldova. In short, the conflict, although 
partly internal, proved also to be amplified by historically antagonistic tensions between 
the Soviet Union (later on Russia) and Romania. 
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1. National Awakening Versus Transdniestrian Antagonism 
Due to the democratization of the Soviet Union, the MSSR underwent several 
objective changes regarding national development. First, the population of the MSSR 
discovered the truth about the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact (1939) and their actual fate. This 
made a large impression on the new growing Moldovan intelligentsia.  Following 
vigorous debates and a massive demonstration, "on August 31, 1989, the MSSR Supreme 
Soviet adopted three new languages laws that declared Moldovan the 'state language' of 
the republic, mandated the transition to the Latin alphabet, [and] implicitly recognized the 
unity of the Moldovan and Romanian languages."69 The Russian language was not 
eliminated from public life, but it only received a status of a language of intra-national 
communication. Such a political move was possible due to a majority of ethnic Moldovan 
elites in the Supreme Soviet. Unfortunately, that political step sparked opposition from 
Slavic and Turkish minorities.70 Such negative attitudes toward reforms were 
strengthened by a declaration of the Popular Front (a new national movement) that the 
language question was the first step in a mass movement for integrating Romanian nation 
and rejecting the Russian dominance.71 That declaration antagonized the majority of the 
Transdniestrian and Gagauzy elites, who made opposite mirror steps playing on the 
ethnical tensions. 
As a result of those policies, in August 1990, the Turkish minority in southern 
Moldova decaled a separate Gagauz Republic, and Transdniestrians declared their own 
Dniestr Republic in September 1990. Both steps seemed the same but had distinctions. 
The Gagauz demands were fairly ethnic: to preserve ethnic sovereignty, equal 
representation, and vote in the political/public life of Moldova. The Transdniestrian 
demands, although initially seemed as ethnic, mostly were political from becoming 
independent to joining Russia or Ukraine. The Transdniestrian elite (see previous section 
about the elite and Table 3), mostly Russians and Ukrainians having been privileged in  
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Soviet times and fearing to become inferior in the new conditions, became the major 
factor for mobilizing the local population and promoting the antagonism toward the new 
central Moldovan authority.72  
Table 3.   National Composition of the Communist Party of Moldova73 
 Moldovan % Ukrainian % Russian % Jewish % 
1925 6.3 31.6 41.6 15.7 
1940 17.5 52.5 11.3 15.9 
1989 47.8 20.7 22.2 2.5 
 
2. Transdniestrian Policy – Mirror Reflection of the Previous Soviet 
Policy; External Factors 
The Transdniestrian elite by the end of the 1980s saw the new situation emerging 
in the Moldavian SSR and prepared to act to defend its position, apparently developing 
plans that they later followed. Moldovan national renaissance, language, political and 
cultural reforms were seen in Transdniestria as evidence of Moldova's intention to leave 
the Soviet Union and to join Romania. Therefore, Tiraspol continued its own preparation 
for secession with open Moscow support.74 An external factor, the 1991 Soviet putsch, 
unpredictably changed both plans. If Soviet putschists had succeeded in their intention, 
the Dniestr Moldovan Republic would have certainly been another repetition of the 
Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of 1924 with similar consequences. 
In January 1990, the leaders of Transdniestria organized a referendum, in which a 
reported 96 percent of voters favored a self-governing status (autonomy) for 
Transdniestria within MSSR.75 In response to the declaration of Moldovan sovereignty 
within the Soviet Union, a congress of local authorities on the east bank declared a 
separate Dniestr Moldovan Republic (DMR) on September 2, 1990. Their principal claim 
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was that DMR was not a part of Moldova but a part of the Soviet federation. The 
interesting fact is again the use of Moldovan in the name of the republic – DMR. 
According to estimates (see table 1) the Moldovans were only 39.9 percent of the 
population. Thus, at the declaration of the Dniestr Moldovan Republic, the majority of the 
populations were Ukrainian (28.3 percent) and Russian (25.5 percent), totally 53.8 
percent with other nationality 6.4 percent (obviously Russian-speaking). Consequently, 
that step was again an attempt to "repeat history" by holding the ground for the 
psychological attack on the Republic of Moldova (either independent or in Romania) 
about superior life in the Soviet Union; or the local elite were unwilling to lose power to 
Ukraine in case of annexation. The Ukrainian interest in regaining the historical land in 
case the Republic of Moldova joined Romania in 1991 to 1992 has never been revealed 
officially. However, the ordinary population widely discussed that possibility. The 
problem with such a move was the possibility it would set a precedent for the Russian 
claim to retake historical Russian Crimea from Ukraine.  
Surprisingly, the Transdniestrian authorities acted quickly. In the unsettled 
situation they shocked the central Moldovan authorities by aggressive actions.  According 
to Charles King, events quickly spiraled out of Chisinau's control:  
Transdniestrian workers armed themselves with weapons from Soviet 
army stores located in Transdniestria and began to take over police 
stations and government institutions along the east bank. At the same time, 
police units still loyal to the central government took up positions along 
the river, barricading bridges and at times exchanging shots with their 
counterparts to the east. Throughout the fall and spring of 1990 and 1991, 
the Transdniestrian side consolidated its hold over the region … also 
gained firm control over portions of the west bank, especially the 
important city of Bender. 76 
The latter move appeared a serious provocation or miscalculation by the Tiraspol 
authorities. If they had not crossed the Dniestr River, their move for independence could 
have been justified. However, the last action virtually cut Moldova from the Soviet Union 
(transforming into the CIS): the major rail and roads links to Ukraine and beyond ran 
through Transdniestria and especially through Bender and Tiraspol. Thus, the 
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development seems as if one state sought to dictate its will on the other coercively. 
However, again another external variable would intervene in the entire process of the 
conflict development – the Moscow coup in August 1991. 
The Moscow coup in August 1991 severed all the Transdniestrians' plans. Within 
days of the collapse of the putsch, on August 27, 1991, the Parliament declared Moldova 
an independent republic and officially took control of the Soviet and party assets on 
Moldovan territory. The reaction of the Transdniestrians to the coup was completely the 
opposite. Elites of Transdniestria, including Igor Smirnov (leader), openly supported the 
putschists calling them saviors of the USSR and promising even military assistance.77 
However, Transdniestria facing dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 now 
had to find another exit from a politically losing situation. All these critical conditions 
and antagonisms were slowly but steadily leading toward military collision. 
3. Eruption of Military Action  
In fact, the military actions did not represent clear military or political objectives 
but rather a deliberate attempt to break the negotiation between Tiraspol and Chisinau 
about a peaceful settlement of the political confrontation. That attempt was accompanied 
by an appeal to all Slavs to come to their assistance, a propaganda war, and indirect but 
decisive military support from the 14th Russian (initially Soviet) Army.78  
Intense military actions erupted when the Moldovan police officers tried to disarm 
the Transdniestrian armed irregulars around Dubasary (city in Transdniestria) on 
December 13, 1991. That incident sparked a series of the clashes along the River. 
According to Charles King: "Tension escalated over the spring and summer 1992, leaving 
hundreds killed. Bridges across the Dniestr were mined or destroyed by the 
Transdniestrians, who also mounted extensive military operations west of the Dniestr."79 
In response, the Moldovan authorities announced a state of emergency. However, such 
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actions would be too late; according to the Moldovan web site: "Transdniestria had 
managed to create its own paramilitary forces, well-equipped, and with local and Russian 
Cossacks and elements of the Russian 14th Army on its side [which was considered 
decisive]."80 Therefore, all other attempts of Chisinau to restore authority over the region 
were unsuccessful. The Transdniestrian population, according to Kaufman, was 
"influenced by manipulation (propaganda): the Tiraspol press was telling voters that the 
alternatives to independence was to submit to a 'new inquisition' by Moldovan 
authorities, and eventually to be swallowed up in an extremely nationalist Romania."81 
Furthermore, the administration of Transdniestria, Kaufman states, "launched a campaign 
of harassment to force out those pro-Chisinau policemen. By April [1992], the fighting 
escalated into position warfare, with Chisinau's forces defending entire villages, where 
they still had a presence, and the Dniestrian forces trying to drive them out."82 All the 
warfare had been accompanied by a series of fragile cease-fires. 
The turning point occurred in June 1992 despite the fact that representatives of the 
Transdniestria received seats in the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova and actually 
started negotiating for peaceful political conflict resolution. For unexplained reasons, the 
Transdniestrians made an unusual political mistake, which from their view was a 
strategically gained objective. If they had not made this error, the Transdniestrian 
Moldovan Republic would have probably been independent nowadays. They attacked the 
police station in the Bender city on the right bank of the Dniestr River, taking control of 
the city. Their main argument was to protect the huge largely Russian-speaking 
population. However, the Transdniestrian authority initially claimed their historical right 
to be independent, which meant respecting the historical border – the Dniestr River. The 
reality was that Bender represented a large industrial complex and artery, linking 
Chisinau with Ukraine and Russia. This could be used as a bargaining tool. 
The question arose: why would a seceding region claiming to be independent 
need a strategically important key objective on the opposite side? In response, the 
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Moldovan forces were compelled to launch a counterattack on Bender succeeding in 
retaking the city. According to Charles King: "In a climactic battle for Bender in June, 
the 14th Army openly intervened, driving the Moldovans troops out of the city and 
inflicting heavy losses."83 As a result, Russia officially became involved in the conflict, 
which made it easy to sustain the status quo of the Transdniestrian side that had gained 
most of the territory they wanted, including industrialized Bender on the other side of the 
Dniestr River. Chisinau saw little productive in counterattacking the 14th Russian Army. 
As a result, the Russian President Yeltsin and the Moldovan President Snegur signed an 
agreement on July 21, 1992, stipulating: 
cessation of hostilities, the creation of a security zone along the river, the 
deployment of a tripartite peacekeeping forces composed of six Russian 
paratroop battalions (under separate operational command from the 
Fourteenth Army) and three each from Moldova and the DMR, and the 
initiation of talks on finding a political solution to the conflict.84   
In short, the military action proved to be more advantageous for the 
Transdniestrian side, which succeeded in persuading neighboring Ukraine and Russia to 
intervene for the purpose of defending of all Slavs. The involvement of the 14th Russian 
Army officially sustained the Transdniestria's gains, leaving the situation ripe for future 
political battles, accidental impacts and for not permitting the Moldovan-Romanian 
unification, which meanwhile became an obsolete argument. In addition, the internal 
conflict also inflamed the relations between the Soviet Union (later on Russia) and 
Romania, which were historically antagonistic. Therefore, the Russia-Romania-Ukraine 
(geographical proximity) triangle should be considered as an important factor for the 
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III. CONFLICT - RESOLUTION PROCESS  
This thesis argues that even though conflict resolution is an internal matter, 
external factors will play a major role in the finality of the political agreement. As long as 
an agreement is not achieved among the major external players, any internal agreement 
will always be vulnerable and fragile in the long run. 
Chapter III demonstrates that the peace process has been conducted through 
internal negotiations and international negotiations. The negotiations demonstrate how 
external factors produced changes, particularly in the position adopted by the 
Transdniestrian leaders and the degree of continuity in the position of the central 
authorities of the Republic of Moldova. This chapter shows that the political deadlock of 
the conflict reflects the inability of the internal conflicting parties to secure a tangency 
point to agree upon. It also shows that the external actors have not had overlap in their 
positions. 
A. NEGOTIATIONS 
Political efforts to resolve the Transdniestrian conflict in the Republic of Moldova 
had started before the major military actions occurred. Therefore, the cease-fire between 
the Transdniestrian paramilitary units and the Moldovan police and armed units indicated 
that only political means could resolve the conflict. Basically, no side achieved a victory 
through military actions because Chisinau did not establish constitutional control over the 
territory east of the Dniestr River and the Transdniestrian leaders did not achieve de jure 
independence. Therefore, the agreement signed between the President of the Russian 
Federation Yeltsin and the President of the Republic of Moldova Snegur on July 21, 
1992, in Moscow stipulated two important decisions: first, to disengage the military 
troops and to create a buffer peacekeeping zone; second, to achieve the resolution by 
political means. This document indicated several political truths: first, who indeed 
controlled the Transdniestrian political elite; second, the impossibility to repeat history by 
creating for a second time the 1924 MASSR in the form of the Dniestr Moldovan 
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Republic because of the different situation;85 third, not only Russian traditional interest 
but the interests of the other external actors collided in that region. This collision had not 
been present before. Independent Ukraine became a strong actor, Romania has been a 
traditional actor toward the Republic of Moldova (Bessarabia), and the U.S. became one 
of the dominant actors in Europe along with the OSCE and NATO. Therefore, even 
though the conflict-resolution process appears to be an attempt to solve an ordinary 
internal conflict between two belligerent parties, external factors have apparently played 
the most important role in the peace process.      
 First, Moldova, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine started to negotiate to solve the 
conflict in March and April of 1992. That already indicated that the problem was more 
than "internal." As a result, a cease-fire was reached on April 7, 1992. It called on the 
states named above to form a commission to fulfill several agreements reached in the 
negotiations: to withdraw the military forces; to disarm the irregular formations; to 
maintain the neutrality; and to define the status of the Russian 14th Army in that area. The 
Joint Commission had a Joint Military Group represented by 25 officers from each state 
to monitor the situation. However, the deadlock in the negotiations occurred due to the 
different interests of the external players.  Russia urged the use of the 14th Army as a 
peacekeeping force (without an international mandate), the inclusion of the Dniestr 
Republic in the negotiations, and the granting of political status to the Dniestrian area in 
Moldova as prerequisites to any settlement. Moldova demanded the withdrawal of the 
Russian Army and the use of different international peacekeepers under the UN mandate. 
Moldovan demands were firmly supported by Romania and Ukraine. The demands did 
not overlap, making cooperation impossible. Therefore, Russia, thinking in realist terms, 
used the military factor to increase pressure on Moldova. Dramatic military actions with 
Russian support occurred in June 1992. This persuaded the new independent Moldovan 
government to meet all the demands of the Russian side.  
 In consequence of those events, the militaries signed a cease-fire on July 7, 1992, 
setting the stage for the next move of the politicians. Soon, on July 13 and 14, Russian 
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Vice-President Alexander Rutskoi had an official meeting with Moldovan President 
Snegur. Rutskoi pressed the Moldovan side to grant the left bank of the Dniestr the status 
of a republic federated with Moldova, which would have created an arrangement that 
seemed like a confederation. In contrast, Chisinau proposed only autonomy for some 
highly Russian-speaking populated cities of the Transdniestria. The Russian side was 
seeking not so much independence of the Transdniestria region (internationally it failed) 
but legal arrangements for stationing of the 14th Army in the region. In those days many 
officers of the Russian 300th Paratrooper Regiment still located in Chisinau informally 
expressed in conversation with Moldovan officers that Russia would never leave 
Moldova and Transdniestria because Moldova is a zone of vital Russian interest.86 Thus, 
the federative (in the form of a confederation) element would have permitted legal 
stationing of the 14th Army. However, provisions in the Moldova's Constitution about 
state neutrality implied the inadmissibility of foreign troops being stationed within state 
territory. That arrangement required the Russian Army to withdraw automatically. 
Consequently, no clear political solution had been negotiated before signing the main 
agreement. 
Thus, the document signed between the Russian and Moldovan Presidents on 21 
July 1992 stipulated: creating a buffer security zone; deploying trilateral peacekeepers 
from Russia (but not from the 14th Army), from Moldova, and from Transdniestria; 
establishing a tripartite Joint Control Commission (JCC) with representatives from 
different governmental organizations; and, most vague, enacting a special statue for the 
Transdniestrian Region to be elaborated later, including the right to decide its own fate if 
Moldova changes its statehood. The latter issue could have been negotiated more 
precisely, but all sides expected to gain from efforts to create a different form of 
diplomacy in the future. Ironically, the bilateral agreement overturned the multilateral 
arrangement of April 7, and the previous (April 17, 1992) multilateral proposal about 
multinational peacekeeping forces from Byelorussia, Bulgaria, Romania, Russia, and 
Ukraine was rejected without explanation. Furthermore, those countries were excluded 
even from political negotiations. According to the Moldovan website, only "in March, 
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1996 at the request of Moldova and Transdniestria at the negotiations was Ukraine 
invited and later in May, 1997 during the signing of the Memorandum in Moscow was an 
agreement in principle reached on the participation of Ukraine's observers in the peace 
keeping mission."87 This last factor contributed to internationalizing the negotiations.  
In fact, the actual internationalization of the process began when the OSCE 
Mission, approved by the OSCE (Vienna, February 4, 1993), started working in Chisinau 
on April 25, 1993 signing a Memorandum with the Moldovan Government on May 7. 
Furthermore, the OSCE reached an Understanding on the Activity of the OSCE Mission 
in Transdniestria on 25 August 1993 and established a branch office in Tiraspol on 
February 13, 1995. The main task of the OSCE mission was established as:  
to facilitate the achievement of a lasting, comprehensive political 
settlement in all its aspects … based on the consolidation of the 
independence and sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova within its 
current borders and reinforcement of the territorial integrity of the State 
along with an understanding about a special status for the Transdniestrian 
region.88  
However, the mission would start to play a significant role only after 1996, when it had 
supposedly accumulated enough objective information. Until that time, the bilateral 
arrangement continued to play a major role. 
Several aspects of the negotiations should be emphasized. First, even though 
antagonism persisted between the former belligerents, bilateral independent expert groups 
were established to find solutions for keeping the parties inside a "common state." These 
groups were productive but not successful due to the different political positions of 
Chisinau and Tiraspol. Nevertheless, those expert groups met regularly under the 
auspices of the OSCE and state-guarantors, Russia and Ukraine. Second, the main debate 
turned around the status of Transdniestria, which started rejecting previous agreements 
about special status and demanding an arrangement, which is usually called 
"confederation" (its own constitution and parliament, and all other necessary state 
institutions). It is important to remember that Russia had previously raised those demands 
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during the conflict. The process moved again when the presidents of Moldova, 
Transdniestria, Russia, Ukraine, and the head of the OSCE Mission signed a 
Memorandum on May 8, 1997, in Moscow.  
The new Memorandum stipulated: "Moldova and Transdniestria build their 
relations in a common state within the limits of the borders of the MSSR at January 1, 
1990 [when Dniestr Moldovan Republic did not exist yet]."89 However, every side again 
interpreted the common state differently. Moldova insisted on integrity according to 
international legislation, but Transdniestria implied the common state should be a 
confederation. Therefore, all the negotiations for a political solution have been 
unsuccessful. 
Significantly, the peace process has itself changed during the past decade due to 
several unpredictable external events. First, the developing democracy in Russia started 
recruiting different political actors, who looked at the situation in Moldova more 
objectively. Second, the outbreaks in the 1994 and again in the 1999 Russian-Chechen 
campaigns drastically impacted the view of the Russian politicians toward conflicts, such 
as Transdniestria. The Chechen separatism influenced the Russian political elite to 
renounce the ideas of supporting the self-determination of the Russians living in the "near 
abroad;"90 second, Moscow started looking more warily at conflicts similar to the 
Chechen one. The OSCE, most European actors, and the U.S. strongly insisted Russia 
withdraw troops from regions such as Moldova and Georgia. The culmination was 
reached during the OSCE Istanbul summit in 1999, when the Russian President 
announced the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Moldova by the end of 2002. 
Second, according to Jow Sawyer, a very important characteristic that Moldova 
understood was: "every step Chisinau [Moldova] has taken toward Russia has cooled 
Moscow's ardor for its rebellious friends in Tiraspol."91 Although the process changed, 
the demands toward Moldova have remained the same. 
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The peace process has now entered another stage. Obviously, the withdrawal of 
14th Army is legally solved. Unless the European status quo changes, Russia appears 
committed to honor the OSCE obligations. However, another factor has started playing a 
role. The Transdniestrian conflict is being used for fully committing the Republic of 
Moldova to cooperate closely with Russia and particularly with the CIS, which is 
Russian-dominated. Specifically, when Moldova tried to take steps toward the European 
Union integration, the peace process began slowing down. The more Moldova openly 
declared its interest in improving its relations with the East, the more the conflict 
pacified. The tactic used in such cases had one common characteristic: during each slow 
down of the peace process the Transdniestrian authorities did not allow Russian officials 
in the region and blocked the withdrawal of the 14th Russian Army according to the 1999 
OSCE declarations;92 meanwhile, Russian officials claimed an inability to do anything 
because of Transdniestrian non-cooperation and Ukrainian demands for expensive 
compensation for passage through its territory. However, when Moldova reapproaches 
Russia, Transdniestria suddenly starts obeying Russian high official delegations and the 
peace process continues.93 Nevertheless, the conflict resolution has now come under firm 
international control, which makes such steps easy to detect and to respond to. The last 
OSCE proposal (2002) for creating a federation in the Republic of Moldova seems to be a 
logical outcome. However, both sides interpret the federation differently, which can 
radically impact the future development of Moldovan foreign policy.  
In summary, the peace process over the Transdniestrian conflict was initially 
conducted bilaterally under the Russian influence, excluding active international 
involvement. That step did not resolve the political conflict but only prolonged the 
stationing of the 14th Army in that region. Nevertheless, later involvement of the OSCE, 
dramatic events in Chechnya, and the involvement of Ukraine in the conflict resolution 
                                                 
92 According to the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) about flank restrictions and the 1999 
OSCE Istanbul Declarations, the Russian Federation assumed the obligations to withdraw the 14th Army 
from Moldova.  
93 From personal experience, official news reports about such situations have often been seen on  
Russian, Moldovan, and Transdniestrian television. See also: Vladimir Muhin, "Transdniestrian Authorities 
Do Not Allow the Russian Military Assets Out of the Region," Russian National Information Service-
Strana.Ru (2000) <http://www.strana.ru/How%20much%20munition%20in%20Transnistria.htm> (11 
October 2002). (Russian); "The Transdniestrian Authorities Continue to Balk to Admission of the Head of 
the OSCE Mission to the Depots with the Russian Federation Ammunition," News Agency INERLIC 
(Moldova) <http://www.interlic.md/print/php?id=1032266912&lang=eng> (17 September 2002).     
43 
internationalized the process allowing the implementing of previous agreements. 
However, the main question about the status of Transdniestria is not solved yet. The 
status of Transdniestria remains a bargaining tool for Russia to influence Moldova's 
future development in the direction of moving "more East than West" (especially on the 
question of practically joining the EU). Even if an internal agreement is reached and 
Transdniestria becomes part of the common federation, the situation will be fragile.  The 
more Moldova tries to distance itself from Russia, the more likely that the 
Transdniestrian conflict will appear again, creating a new disturbance for Moldova and 
for the region. 
B. POLITICAL DEADLOCK OF THE CONFLICT  
The political deadlock of the conflict illustrates the inability of Chisinau and 
Tiraspol to find a political tangency point on which they could agree. Many politicians in 
Moldova have started perceiving that the main obstacle to resolving the conflict is the 
"totalitarian" regime in Transdniestria and its leader, Igor Smirnov. For instance, the 
leader of the Moldovan Social-Democratic Party, Oazu Nantoi, stresses:  
If Igor Smirnov gives up at the negotiation table, that will mean his 
immediate end as a representative of Transdniestria. The Transdniestrian 
regime, being essentially a totalitarian regime, can neither be ‘intimidated’ 
nor 'influenced' to change its nature and to renounce its own interests. 
Meanwhile, conflict resolution cannot be found in the triangle Chisinau – 
Tiraspol - Moscow because of a simple fact, it does not exist there.94 
In fact, the Tiraspol regime suppresses the political opposition parties; free mass media is 
unthinkable in Transdniestria.95 According to several independent sources, the regime 
tried to smuggle weapons across the Ukrainian border.96 Recently, the regime even 
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started harassing the Russian troops in the region concerning withdrawal and neutralizing 
munitions. The OSCE and other states cannot influence this de facto independent regime. 
Additional conventional wisdom is that the main independent cause for deadlock in 
political negotiations is the totalitarian Tiraspol regime amplified by personal antagonism 
between the government officials of Moldova and the authorities of the self-declared 
Dniestr Moldovan Republic. As President of the Republic of Moldova, Vladimir 
Voronin, said in interview to the Russian Newspaper and the newspaper Trud: 
Right now there are no problems in Moldova [which existed in 1992], but 
the Transdniestrian authorities do not want to negotiate because the 
solution is not to their advantage. I now understand that after our four 
meetings with the leader of Transdniestria, Igor Smirnov. Therefore, I will 
not meet with him anymore ….  97 
Similarly, the Transdniestrian leader, Igor Smirnov, in an interview with the Russian 
newspaper Izvestia replied: "I have not maintained any relations with him [President of 
Moldova] … His actions demonstrate that he is a Moldovan nationalist."98 
The reality on the ground demonstrates a different picture indicating three main 
causes for the inability to solve the conflict. The first cause has been an unclear 
Moldovan foreign policy lacking continuity for the past decade. Second, the commitment 
of the European states as well as the U.S. to solve the question of the Russian Army in 
Transdniestria antagonized the Russian and Transdniestrian (pro-Russian) elites. For 
some Russian political forces Transdniestria became a matter of prestige. Finally, the 
influence of the other actors brought about change in the peace process. The pro-
Romanian political opposition in Moldova has stressed the inevitability of Bessarabia to 
join Romania while giving Transdniestria the self-determination choice. Romania 
diplomatically declared that history would demonstrate the truth of this claim. 
Meanwhile, if Transdniestrian self-determination leads to a request to join Russia, 
Ukraine can set the condition not to have a second Russian Kaliningrad situation99 and 
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would seek to influence the former historical territory. In the event that Transdniestria 
joins Russia, Ukraine will be in a position similar to Lithuania concerning the Russian 
Kaliningrad district. That will imply a similar dispute over unrestricted passage of the 
Russian population, merchandise, and possibly militaries through the Ukrainian territory 
toward the federative Russian subject (Transdniestria). The entire puzzle appears to 
reveal a collision of external interests. Therefore, even if the internal agreement has come 
to some logical conclusion, such as federalizing the Republic of Moldova, the additional 
external causes are still unsolved.          
1. Position of the Central Authority of the Republic of Moldova 
From the beginning, the official Moldovan position has been based on seeking 
multi-lateral international agreement with different international organizations' support. 
That approach presumed the integrity of the unitary republic, neutrality, and the 
inadmissibility of stationing foreign troops on its territory. The principles emphasized 
during the negotiations have been: central authorities of Moldova are the only authority 
responsible for the entirety of Moldova's territory; the conflict should be solved in 
conformity with international legislation; and Transdniestria should have broad 
autonomous status in accordance with international laws. The other demands have been 
one army, one currency, and one customs service. The recent international OSCE 
proposal federalizing Moldova basically fits the above-mentioned principles. The self-
ruling principles in Transdniestria are accepted if they do not contradict Moldova's 
constitution.  
However, the Republic of Moldova has avoided the main and vital question for 
Transdniestria. The future of small states will depend on their ability to adapt to 
globalization demands. In other words, being in Europe, small states should determine 
their economic course and make a decision to join a collective economic organization, 
such as the EU, CIS or some other. The problem has been a lack of continuity in the 
Moldovan foreign policy in this area. For instance, Moldova initially joined the CIS 
structure with the exception of the Treaty of Collective Security, due to its neutrality 
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status, and after that joined the GUUAM initiative; next, Moldova joined the Stability 
Pact for the South-Eastern Europe. Also, Moldova declared the intention to join the 
European Union: "Premier Vasile Tarliev [Moldova] stated on Wednesday [October 16, 
2002] that the integration into the European Union remains a priority of Moldova …."100 
On the other hand, the Speaker of the Moldovan Parliament declared that the ruling party 
"keeps all options open from the election program, including the possibility of the 
Republic of Moldova to join the Russia-Byelorussia Union…."101 That intention presents 
the desire of Chisinau to be in two different economic spheres, which sounds reasonable 
in its complicated situation. However, Moldova's EU integration contradicts the intention 
of the Transdniestrian elite to be initially in the Soviet and after that in the Russian sphere 
of influence, which means the CIS or Russia-Byelorussia Union. Even if Moldova 
declared its intention to join such a union, the political elite and population will not 
accept that. According to an opinion poll conducted by Moldovan official media:  
Forty-one percent of the population answered the question about the 
external orientation of Moldova that the best option would be close 
cooperation with the CIS, and another 40 percent desire integration into 
the European Union. Another 4 percent think that the Republic of 
Moldova should not participate either in the CIS or the EU. About 40 
percent consider that Russia interferes in internal Moldovan matters and 
46 percent accused Romania.102    
Thus, radical changes in the Moldovan foreign policy can cause polarization of the 
society making possible destabilization. 
 In summary, the Moldova's position toward the Transdniestrian conflict resolution 
has remained the same. However, the demands toward Moldova have drastically changed 
during the peace process, recently indicating that conflict resolution will depend on the 
precise foreign policy toward the East. That revealed that Transdniestria has repeatedly 
been used as an external factor to influence Moldova.   
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2. Position of the Transdniestrian Leaders 
The position of the Transdniestrian leaders deserves respect due to their ability to 
pursue firmly their main strategic goals by different demands and means: to bring 
Transdniestria in the Soviet/Russian sphere of influence, and recently to check any 
unwanted foreign policy movement of Moldova, as was done from 1924 to 1939. 
Initially, the Transdniestrian leaders demanded only sovereignty. When it became 
clear that the Soviet Union would collapse and the Republic of Moldova would be 
independent, they demanded independence and union with Russia, lately even with 
Ukraine. Their acceptance of a common state (in the 1997 agreement) implied 
confederation, which fits in that definition. During the entire negotiations, Tiraspol 
stressed that when Moldova declared the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop pact invalid, it lost 
the right to Transdniestria. However, the Bender city siege by Transdniestria also did not 
fit in that Pact. During the process the Transdniestrian leader also tried to play the 
Ukrainian card by attempting to secure Ukrainian support, but the Russians have always 
balanced such moves according to the Transdniestrian official website: "We [Tiraspol] 
appealed to the President of Ukraine asking him to direct the Ukrainian peacekeepers to 
our region … Ukraine positively replied … But Russians blocked such resolutions."103  
Therefore, after an understanding of the strong international commitment to preserve the 
integrity of Moldova, their demands changed: to have a confederative state, to have the 
Russian language as an official language, and to have the name changed from Moldova to 
Moldavia (the Stalin-era given name). The recent OSCE proposal about federalization 
they interpreted differently: "V. Litskai [Foreign Minister of Transdniestria] said that 
federation and confederation are similar."104 Furthermore, the methods of the 
Transdniestrian leaders to achieve their goals reflect an old-fashioned Realpolitik:  
We will torpedo all their [Chisinau] decisions in all directions [in case of 
pressure on Transdniestria]. We have experience fighting back and enough 
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tools. In fact, we control about 90 percent of Moldovan transport, 60 
percent of the gas pipelines. The water supply lines, including for 
Chisinau, also come from the Dniestr. Thus, they are in our hands. We can 
in one hour close all gas pipelines, including – strategic … All schemes 
are prepared. Our strikes are especially effective in the winter.105  
Thus, their intention remained unchangeable: to be independent from Chisinau.  
 In summary, without external pressure the Transdniestrian regime will stick to its 
demands to have either an independent or semi-independent state. The principal demand 
will be the right to conduct its own foreign policy. The Moldovan dependence on the 
Transdniestrian region will be used for bargaining with Chisinau. Because the 
Transdniestrian leaders have not changed since 1990, the regime can be classified as 
authoritarian. As noted, the regime suppresses any political movement in the republic and 
does not allow a free media. In such conditions, the Transdniestrian population is not 
likely to contribute to the peace process in contrast to the situation in Moldova. 
Furthermore, Russia is supporting the regime from the outside. 
3. Attitude of the International Organizations106 
The relevant international organizations are the OSCE and CIS. The initial request 
for international peacekeepers under the UN mandate failed due to Russia's ability to veto 
UN Security Council resolutions. Obviously, at that time, the Soviet Union and later 
Russia still had suspiciousness toward the United States and NATO. Therefore, the 
appeal to invite the OSCE was accepted because Russia has always argued that only the 
OSCE should become the collective security organization in Europe. Thus, the OSCE 
played a vital role by internationalizing the peace process and structuring the independent 
experts' negotiations. The main OSCE inputs have been: pressing Russia to withdraw 
troops  from  Transdniestria  and  a  new  vital  proposal  (2002)  about  federalizing  the 
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Republic of Moldova. However, overall neither the OSCE nor the CIS could effectively 
influence the situation, demonstrating that the peace settlement has depended more on 
bilateral negotiations. 
4. Attitude of the Main Co-interested States Toward the Conflict 
The interested parties to the conflict can be characterized regionally and geo-
strategically. Regional states, Ukraine and Romania, are interested due to historical 
reasons concerning the Republic of Moldova. Geo-strategic players, Russia, the United 
States of America, and West-European states, can be interested in resolving the conflict 
due to strategic goals concerning the Balkans and the Danube River. The latter point 
represents an echo from the cold war, but should not be ignored.  
Romania has tried several times to help the authority of Moldova to balance the 
situation in the international arena. But the existing antagonism in Transdniestria toward 
Romania, resulting from the World War II Holocaust, and Romania's traditional cool 
relations with Russia and now with Ukraine due to the Bessarabia/Bukovina question, led 
the Romanian factor to be excluded from the process. Generally, attempting to join 
NATO and the EU, Romania, according to the Moldovan website, has appealed for 
"identification of some rational resolutions, which would serve to stabilize the Republic 
of Moldova and the region. Concerning the Russian Federation, it, in Iliescu's [Romanian 
President] opinion, would help more in the resolution of the problem."107 
Ukraine played a different role during the entire process. Initially, Ukraine closed 
its eyes to the passing Russian volunteers and Cossacks to assist Transdniestrians. At that 
time, according to the Moldovan website, Ukraine declared partial support for Tiraspol: 
Kravchiuk [President of the Ukraine in 1992] expressed his support to 
Yeltsin and also declared that if Chisinau decides to unite with Romania, 
then Kiev would be a guarantee of 'free choice' for Transdniestria but for 
the present moment Ukraine stands for the autonomy of Transdniestria, in 
the limits of the borders of the Republic of Moldova.108  
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However, the Ukrainian position radically changed when the same technique for 
separatism was applied in the Crimean peninsula, almost a duplication of the situation in 
Transdniestria. From that point on, Kiev played a moderate position claiming only special 
status for Transdniestria. However, local Ukrainian authorities close to Transdniestria's 
region had a different view because of their ability to profit from this non-recognized 
region. According to the Moldovan website, smuggling from Transdniestria through 
Ukraine became common, indicating close economic cooperation: "Close to the border of 
the Republic of Moldova [Transdniestria], border troops and the secret service of Ukraine 
confiscated contraband delivery from Transdniestria, which they evaluated as worth 
$80,000."109 Thus, under circumstances of contraband and the Crimea question, Ukraine 
has moved in favor of supporting the Chisinau claim for integrity, meanwhile being a 
guarantor for the special status of the Transdniestria.       
 Russia has always maintained a geo-strategic perspective on Transdniestria by 
monitoring the actions of Romania, the foreign policy of the Republic of Moldova, and 
the strategic movements in Europe and the Balkans. Transdniestria has been used only as 
a tool of coercive diplomacy: "Chairman of the Russian Federation State Duma 
[parliament] Ghenadii Selezniov declared that his country supported Tiraspol authority 
for the purpose of 'preserving the sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova.'"110 Their 
policy collided with Ukraine when it was forming the GUUAM initiative. The main idea 
of the GUUAM initiative was to build oil and gas pipelines from Azerbaijan through 
Georgia and Ukraine bypassing Russian territory. Moldova was supposed to profit from 
that (including Transdniestria). However, Transdniestrian authorities declared several 
times the anti-Russian character of the GUUAM. Therefore, Ukraine did everything 
possible to avoid Moldovan territory.  
However, the main modern interest of Russia slowly became the domination of 
the Moldovan market and not strategic military plans. For instance, according to the 
Moldovan website: 
                                                 
109 "Enforcement Authority from Ukraine Captured a Big Lot of Contraband from Transdniestria," 
INFOTAG, MOLDOVA AZI (1998-2002, Romanian) <http://www.azi.md/print/20019/Ro> (24 July 
2002). (Translation by author.) 
110 "Russian Federation Oversight the Sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova," Reporter-MD (2001)    
<http://www.reporter_md.htm>  (22 October 2002). (Russian) (Translation by author.) 
51 
Pavel Petrovsky [Russian ambassador in Moldova] pointed out that after 
Vladimir Voronin [with pro-Russian cooperation views] had come to 
power in Moldova, 'Russian people of business came to see that Moldova 
has turned its face to Russia: The signature of the Basic Political Treaty 
with Russia does not at all mean that this holds Moldova away from 
Europe, as some local party leaders claim … He [advising federation] 
emphasized that a divided Moldova would never be admitted to either the 
European Union or other European structures: the longer the 
Transdniestrian conflict drags on, the farther from Europe Moldova would 
be finding itself.111 
Thus, Russia, facing strong barriers to influence the Balkan direction, because of NATO's 
expansion to include Hungary and possibly (invited at the Prague NATO summit in 
2002) Romania and Bulgaria, concentrated on economic matters concerning the Republic 
of Moldova. Basically, Russia can disturb the Transdniestrian question if Moldova expels 
Russian business from the region. The danger in such a situation is obviously the 
possibility for Moldova (having a weak economy) to become completely dependent on 
Russia. According to the Russian view, the goal has been achieved: the Republic of 
Moldova remained in the Russian sphere of influence. Consequently, Transdniestria in 
the near future will be pacified until the next Moldovan attempt to join Romania or 
integrate completely westward. 
 The West-European states and the U.S. have paid only geo-strategic attention to 
the development of the conflict, looking at the similarities to the Crimea, Abkhazia 
(Georgia), and Tajikistan conflict situations. The main focus has been on pressing Russia 
for withdrawal of the 14th Army from the region to secure the Balkans and to neutralize 
the large amount of munitions. The main emphasis has been the territorial integrity of 
Moldova and an international approach toward conflict resolution. The suggested 
approach also reflects the internal solution, support for federalization, and diplomatically 
not touching another sphere of influence. For example, according to the Moldovan news 
agency "Infotag":  
Mr. Soros said he had been shocked at such a proposal [federalization] and 
at the USA's support of that document. He believes the effect of that 
document would  be  Moldova's  complete falling under the protectorate of 
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Russia. 'This is very dangerous for Moldova …' Russian protectorate and 
Russia's participation [in the Moldovan economy] in privatization are two 
different things. 112   
In conclusion, conventional wisdom states that the Transdniestrian conflict 
resulted from internal ethnic and political problems. Additionally, Chisinau and Tiraspol 
have had difficulties achieving a political resolution due to their inability to find the 
tangency point for cooperation. This thesis does not reject this claim. The internal 
agreement should be the basis for the resolution. However, as stressed in the introduction 
of this thesis, even if an internal agreement is reached satisfying Transdniestria's leaders, 
the Republic of Moldova will always be dependent on the commitment to the East in the 
current regional order. The more Moldova tries to move west, the more the Transdniestria 
problem will again surface. Thus, the stability in the Republic of Moldova, with its 
vulnerable geographical location and limited state capacity, will depend on a cautious 
Moldovan foreign policy and interactions between Romania, Ukraine, and importantly 
Russia. Therefore, in addition to the internal agreement, an external approach should be 
employed to cement the peace process. The external approach should avoid past mistakes 
and interconnect the external players with the supervision of the OSCE and the support of 
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IV. POTENTIAL EXTERNAL APPROACHES TOWARD 
RESOLVING THE TRANSDNIESTRIAN CONFLICT 
Traditionally, the Chinese think in terms of millennia, the Russians in 
terms of centuries, the Europeans in terms of generations ….113 
States that have close effective links with ethnic group in another state will 
often not remain indifferent to the fate of these groups.114 
The weak states, in fact, occasionally became the victims of the balance-
of-power system and of the unwritten but operative dictum that if two or 
more major actors can agree to divide up a weaker actor, they probably 
will.115 
Interdependence affects world politics and the behavior of states; but 
governmental actions also influence patterns of interdependence. By 
creating or accepting procedures, rules, or institutions for certain kinds of 
activity, governments regulate and control transnational and interstate 
relations.116 
In fact, while the internal part of the conflict resolution should be constructed 
bottom up, the international and regional environment also plays an important role, 
making it necessary to assess the possible external conflict resolution steps. Therefore, 
this chapter argues that such a top-down approach is highly desirable for the 
Transdniestrian conflict resolution. 
This chapter will demonstrate that in the context of different conflicts, for 
instance Cyprus, Kashmir, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, several international relations 
schools of thought have been trying to explain such security dilemmas. First, this chapter 
shows the realist approach toward the conflict. According to the realist suggestion, the 
internal Moldovan conflict will eventually bring the Republic of Moldova under the 
major control of the Russian Federation; consequently, the other interested actors can 
play the opposite role, which can destabilize the region. As a result, neither the security 
of Moldova nor the Transdniestrian conflict will be solved in the long term. Second, this 
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chapter demonstrates the liberal and constructivist approaches toward the conflict. These 
suggest a possible solution to the Transdniestrian conflict by applying the neo-liberalist 
and constructivist approaches in the form of regional complex interdependence, aiming 
for a long-term solution. The new interdependence will eventually create new norms and 
principles leading to a new regional regime among the Republic of Moldova, Romania, 
Russia, and Ukraine. Therefore, to continue the conflict will be irrelevant because the 
interdependence will eliminate the cyclical appearance of the conditions for such a 
conflict in the future. 
A. THE REALIST APPROACH AND ITS LIMITS 
The first school of international relations, realism, emphasizes the centrality of 
power politics in the international system. The realists assume that the main actors of the 
international system are sovereign states. The main argument of the realists is that outside 
of the state – in the absence of a central authority – anarchy prevails. 117 Therefore, 
realists assume that the struggle for survival is the state's main preoccupation; security is 
achieved through power politics, military force, and economic domination, by putting 
other states in a dependent position. That leads states to be concerned about relative gains 
and losses during their interactions. Furthermore, the security dilemma is the central 
element of the states' interactions.118 Thus, in such interactions, the states conduct a 
foreign policy of Realpolitik based on calculations of power and interest, which 
consequently tends to create balances of power or alliance arrangements among the states 
in the international system.119 
Examining the regional environment around the Republic of Moldova and taking 
into consideration realist assumptions about international relations, the present situation 
dictates that the Russian Federation will remain a regional power having an asymmetrical 
advantage over other states, including Romania and Ukraine. That leads toward another 
assumption that Russia has the capability to influence the settlement of the 
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Transdniestrian conflict in favor of its political and security interests and gains. For 
instance, the example of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina demonstrated that due to 
the asymmetrical disadvantage of Serbia (former Yugoslavia) and Croatia confronting the 
U.S. and West-European states, neither Bosnian Serbs nor Bosnian Croats could achieve 
their full objective and unite with correspondingly Serbia and Croatia.120 In contrast, the 
Kashmir and Cyprus conflicts demonstrated that not having sufficient asymmetrical 
advantages, the supportive actors (India/Pakistan and Greece/Turkey) have not been able 
to influence the conflicts' outcomes in their favor.121 Thus, taking into consideration the 
asymmetrical advantage of Russia and its interest, according to the Russian official 
website, in making "bilateral relations [Moldova-Russia] strategic in the long-term,"122 
realism predicts that the internal conflict resolution will result in advantageous gains for 
Russia when compared to the other interested states, Romania and Ukraine. 
In a situation, when "both Russia and Ukraine have played ambivalent and 
sometimes counterproductive roles, serving to mediate the dispute while also competing 
with one another as interested parties,"123 the realist school predicts two possible 
outcomes. First, in the long run, the Republic of Moldova will become asymmetrically 
dependent on the Russian Federation, which can lead to a domestic backlash similar to 
1992. Second, to counter effectively the Russian influence in the region, Ukraine and 
Romania will be challenged to proceed with balance-of-power arrangements. Indeed, 
both outcomes are highly possible due to several reasons. First, as William Crowther 
stated:  
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playing on Moldova's vulnerabilities, Russian leaders employed various 
methods, including its control over vital raw materials and its influence on 
events in Transdniestria, to induce Moldova to participate more fully in 
CIS institutions … as Chisinau warmed toward the CIS relations between 
Romania and Moldova have become increasingly hostile.124  
Second, at the NATO Prague Summit (November 2002) Romania was invited to join 
NATO. Meanwhile, Ukraine also declared its intention to join NATO and to maintain the 
GUUAM organization, which signal the objective to go westward or to balance the 
Russian influence in the region.125 In short, according to the Conference Report of the 
US National Intelligence Council, the situation in Moldova cannot be resolved without 
Russia, "but conflict in Transdniestria also requires coordination with Ukraine,"126 and 
maintaining sensitive Moldova-Romania relations. 
In such a regional arrangement, the Republic of Moldova, forced to become a 
strategic partner of Russia, may find itself between two possible NATO members. 
Consequently, due to the geographical dependence on Romania and Ukraine, the 
Republic of Moldova will be challenged to cooperate with them and to renounce the 
strategic partner status with Russia. However, taking into account the situations of 
Transdniestria in Moldova and Crimea in Ukraine, Russia will continue to possess the 
ability to promote a general atmosphere of anxiety about [Russian] minorities, which may 
be seen as a threat to state security, according to Stephen Ryan: "a Trojan horse serving 
the interests of outside powers."127 According to the realist assumptions, a similar 
situation exists in the Serbian-backed Republica Srpska in Bosnia and Herzegovina. As 
long as peacekeeping forces remain in the region, and the U.S. and the EU counter Serbia 
at all levels, the Republica Srpska will maintain the status quo. However, if the 
international/regional status quo radically changed, the seceding of the Republic Srpska 
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with Serbia's support would be likely. Likewise, in the long run, the situation in 
Transdniestria can be destabilized again if gains and losses among the external actors 
become disproportional to the states' expectations based on the balance of power. 
In summary, the realism approach toward the resolution of the Transdniestrian 
conflict will contribute only toward short-term stability. In the long-term perspective, no 
matter who will influence the Republic of Moldova/Transdniestria, the situation in the 
region will depend on external political impact and any conflict resolution will be 
vulnerable to changes in the international and regional status quo order. Due to its limited 
state capacity and to a vulnerable geographical location, the Republic of Moldova will 
not have the capability to counter possible external impacts.   
B. LIBERAL AND CONSTRUCTIVIST APPROACHES AND THEIR 
LIMITS: PFP, CIS, OSCE, GUUAM, STABILITY PACT 
Two schools have challenged the realist school of international relations: 
liberalism and constructivism, which overlap in their implications. 
Some recent versions of liberalism (known as neo-liberalism) accept many realist 
assumptions about the anarchic nature of the international system but reject realism's 
conclusions. The neo-liberalists stress that international cooperation is possible under 
certain conditions, which can be reinforced by multilateral institutions.128 For example, 
complex interdependence between states creates incentives for them to manage their 
economic and political relations through international organizations and significantly 
reduces state concentration on power politics and military force. Furthermore, the 
growing status of civil societies and non-state actors complements this process. Liberal 
institutionalism argues that because power has been transforming toward economic, 
political and social forms, the non-military dimension of security and cooperation among 
states increases.129 Neo-liberalists argue that new interests, norms, and knowledge lead to 
international regime formation and change.130  
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From a different direction another international relations school, constructivism, 
has been moving toward some similar conclusions. That school embraces elements of 
post-Marxism, feminism, peace studies, and post-modernism, but does not fully reflect 
any of them. Constructivism rejects the ontological assumptions of both realism and 
liberalism. That school emphasizes the socially constructed nature of security relations, 
believing in the reality of a "society of states," "family of nations," and "world public 
opinion," and rejects the anarchical view of the international system.131 Their view 
emphasizes the role of non-state actors and nonmilitary dimensions of security, and sees a 
possibility for moral concerns to play a role in the international environment and security 
issues.132 In summary, nowadays, constructivism focuses on the socially constructed 
nature of international politics by indicating the growing role of democracies around the 
globe and consequently the growing role of domestic democratic politics. The bottom 
line is that states not only shape the international system but also the international system 
influences states/domestic politics, and international norms and state interests become 
mutually interdependent. 
Following liberal and constructivist assumptions, the Transdniestrian conflict 
could have been solved based on the social character of the regional international system 
by appealing to humanity, involving international organizations, and creating a regional 
regime respected by the states. However, the fact that neither the UN nor the OSCE could 
have intervened in time in the Transdniestrian conflict in 1991 and 1992 demonstrates 
that powerful states still have the ability to avoid international organizations' pressure and 
pursue their own interest through different means. Second, the conflict in Cyprus 
revealed that a third party, the UN, can play a role in the peace process, but only under 
the expectation that the disputants do not think of the mediator as the finder of the 
solution.133   Thus,  the  Transdniestrian   conflict   and   other   experiences  suggest  that 
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international organizations and the social aspects of international order can contribute 
toward the peaceful settlement of conflicts but do not necessarily guarantee complete 
conflict resolution. 
In the Transdniestrian conflict, the authorities of the Republic of Moldova from 
the beginning tried to arrange an international approach toward the conflict resolution by 
emphasizing the necessity of turning to the UN and the OSCE as a principle of 
international law. The Republic of Moldova has been trying to follow a multi-lateral 
foreign policy by having balanced relations with many states, including Romania, Russia, 
and Ukraine. Furthermore, participating in many international organizations and 
arrangements was considered as Moldova's objective to internationalize the conflict 
resolution. First, Moldova joined the CIS (except for the military part) to neutralize 
assumptions it held a hostile attitude toward post-Soviet republics, including Russia. 
Second, in 1994, Moldova joined the "Partnership for Peace" initiative of NATO to 
demonstrate a cooperative attitude toward promoting stability in Europe. Next, in 1997 
Moldova joined the GUUAM arrangement expecting to profit economically from 
regional cooperation and hoping to gain support from Transdniestrian authorities. Next, 
Moldova joined the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe (2001) trying to achieve 
interdependent integration in that region and prospective integration into EU 
structures.134 Additionally, Moldovan and Transdniestrian NGOs have established a level 
of cooperation in social and cultural spheres: for example, Transdniestrian sportsmen 
regularly participate in the Republic of Moldova teams at international competitions; 
cultural activities have been conducted in friendly atmospheres; population and business 
elites from Transdniestria have been always having free access to entire Moldovan 
territory and markets. Importantly, by admitting the OSCE as a central mediator, the 
situation should have improved considerable. However, the conflict development and 
negotiations have demonstrated the fact (just as Cyprus depends on relations between 
Turkey and Greece) that in the current regional order the conflict resolution still largely 
depends on the policies of Russia and Ukraine, and potential sensitivity of Romania. 
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In summary, liberalists and constructivists, contrary to realists, expect a growing 
role for international organizations and non-state actors, and evolutionary change in the 
international environment around the Republic of Moldova. However, the conflict 
resolution concerning Transdniestria has demonstrated that mediators should also not 
exclude realist assumptions about the interest and power of external states, which can 
influence the internal situation in the Republic of Moldova. Furthermore, in the short run, 
the external actors will be obviously more effective than in the long run. Therefore, the 
authorities of the Republic of Moldova and mediators seeking an internal solution should 
also concentrate on the external approach to secure the peace settlement. 
C. USING COMPLEX INTERDEPENDENCE TO SOLVE THE CONFLICT 
The basis for the Transdniestrian conflict solution should be a negotiated internal 
agreement under international auspices, which ought to reflect a compromise between the 
disputants. Meanwhile, achieving this, mediators should also concentrate on eliminating 
the causes of the conflict and diminishing the asymmetry in the influence of external 
actors in the Republic of Moldova. That will remove the possibility of cyclical (or 
dialectical) appearance of the conditions for such a conflict in the future. To solve the 
Transdniestrian conflict in the Republic of Moldova in the long run, this thesis suggests 
creating regional complex interdependence around the Republic of Moldova. That 
resolution basically suggests interconnecting the countries interested in this geo-political 
region: Romania, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine. This proposal presumes external 
and domestic approaches, which will involve multiple actors cooperating through 
multiple channels. 
In fact, multiple channels of communication, multiple issues on interstate 
agendas, and unwillingness of governments to use military force toward other 
governments characterize complex interdependence.135 Thus, the Republic of Moldova 
with international support should establish transgovernmental relations with Romania, 
Russia, and Ukraine. Transgovernmental relations presume to be the unofficial foreign 
policy conducted between government departments of one state and those of another.136 
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In practice, working relations among the governmental officials below the top levels 
should be established in the long rung. Additionally, the interstate agendas for action 
should include multiple issues other than security and politics. An economic agenda of 
cooperation is especially desirable. Also, the agenda must include cooperative military 
aspects such as joint operations. Specifically, the proposed regional complex 
interdependence presumes the creation of elements such as a quadripartite economical 
free trade zone, and combined quadripartite military cooperation in humanitarian, anti-
terrorist, illegal immigration and smuggling, and peacekeeping missions. The main 
factors, which would interest all participants, would be a common regional stability and 
the connection of Russia and Southeastern Europe's markets. Importantly, all these 
interconnections should equally represent Moldova, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine. Any 
asymmetrical representations during the initial stage of cooperation will imbalance the 
proposed complex interdependence causing unilateral dependence leading to 
countermeasures by other actors. 
Complex interdependence theory also draws a distinction between dependence 
and interdependence. The former implies a state of being determined or significantly 
affected by external forces. The latter one implies situations characterized by reciprocal 
effects among countries having joint gains and losses.137 Thus, the Republic of Moldova 
with international support should carefully conduct foreign policy and economic 
cooperation, eliminating existing vulnerabilities in raw material and energy resources. 
The financial investment of Russia, Romania, and Ukraine in Moldova should be 
symmetrically proportional to prevent Moldova's dependence, especially the 
Transdniestrian region, on any one external state. In particular, Romanian and Western 
investments are highly desirable in Transdniestria. Thus, creating complex 
interdependence around the Republic of Moldova will contribute to internal conflict 
resolution in the long run by strengthening the internal agreement and reducing the state's 
vulnerabilities. 
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Western Europe provides a possible model for the creation of complex 
interdependence. Jean Monnet (one of the creators of the EC architecture) noted with 
respect to Western Europe: 
There will be no peace in Europe if states reestablish themselves on the 
basis of national sovereignty, with all that this implies by way of prestige 
policies and economic protectionism. If countries once more protect 
themselves against each other, it will once more be necessary to build up 
vast armies ….138                                                               
Reflecting on the success of Monnet's vision, Alexander Wendt observes: 
A strong liberal or constructivist analysis of this problem would suggest 
that four decades of cooperation may have transformed a positive 
interdependence of outcomes into collective European identity in terms of 
which states increasingly define their 'self-interest.' Even if egoistic 
reasons were its starting points, the process of cooperating tends to 
redefine those reasons by reconstituting identities and interests in terms of 
new inter-subjective understandings and commitments.139 
Thus, the West-European pursuit of interconnections beyond the intergovernmental 
contributed to the creation of complex interdependence. In the case of the Cyprus dispute, 
direct conflict between Turkey and Greece is not likely to occur due to the involvement 
of these states in West-European complex interdependence, where non-cooperation can 
cost more than cooperation. In contrast, the absence of complex interdependence between 
India and Pakistan does not exclude continuing bilateral confrontation over the Kashmir 
region because there are few benefits from cooperation that could be lost. Consequently, 
complex interdependence affected European politics and state behaviors, and 
governmental actions in turn influenced patterns of European interdependence. 
The weakest point of the proposal about complex interdependence around the 
Republic of Moldova is the absence of collective defense commitments in the region, 
which theoretically leaves the possibility of military rivalry. Even in November 1932, the 
British professor Ramsay Muir claimed an interdependent world was emerging due to 
four factors: conquest of distance, creation of a single world political system, cultural 
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assimilation, and economic interdependence.140 However, to achieve a fully 
interdependent world, Ramsay Muir also urgently suggested the limitation of state 
sovereignty, abolition of war, and promotion of economic cooperation. Nevertheless, the 
Second World War became further proof of the inability of the interdependent economies 
to produce lasting cooperation without strong security arrangements.  
Responding to that claim, this thesis assumes that military confrontations between 
Russia and Ukraine, despite their friction, are not likely to occur because both their 
economies and social spheres are highly interdependent.141 Meanwhile, Romania will not 
be militarily threatened either by Russia or Ukraine because of the high probability of 
NATO membership in 2004. Furthermore, according to William Crowther, "on purely 
diplomatic ground, Romania has little or nothing to gain from instability on its eastern 
border."142 Additionally, Romania has been trying to join the EU, another element of 
European interdependence. Thus, in the near future, due to evolving Russia-U.S. 
(September 11 impact) and NATO-Russia (new NATO-Russia Council)143 cooperation 
and the shifting center of strategic instability from Europe to the Middle East and Far 
East, the region around the Republic of Moldova will not experience geo-strategic 
tensions to provoke military inter-state confrontations. Furthermore, if one strategically 
assesses Russian threats and security risks, the center of gravity is shifting toward other 
regions: the Caucasus (Chechnya, tension with Georgia, Armenia-Azerbaijan dispute), 
Central Asia (Tajikistan), the Caspian Sea dispute, and the Far East where there is a 
potential conflict with China arising from long-term demographic trends.144 In summary, 
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due to evolving world and regional security situations, the region around the Republic of 
Moldova will likely not have military interstate confrontations in the near future; 
therefore, the evolving complex interdependence will have time to establish strong links 
at all levels, which will potentially change the regional regime and constructively 
eliminate the preconditions for the Transdniestrian conflict in the future.   
In summary, regional complex interdependence would be applicable to the 
Republic of Moldova presuming deeper interconnection with Romania, Russia, and 
Ukraine along with the U.S. and the EU's support under the OSCE umbrella. The 
necessity of the US and the EU monitoring is due to several factors. First, these actors 
will ensure that Russian forces withdraw from Transdniestria according to the OSCE and 
Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) obligations. Second, they will balance the 
Russian power in the region by allowing the evolution of the complex interdependence to 
start working in the long term. Subsequently, that will lead toward establishing indeed 
complex interdependent interactions in proposed regional free trade zone and cooperative 
effort to combat the common regional instability and threats. Such interconnected 
interactions in the long run will create a common interest not only between Chisinau and 
Tiraspol but also among the external actors interested in that geo-political region. 
Additionally, complex interdependence will create the new identity within Republic of 
Moldova; therefore, either Tiraspol or Chisinau will no longer perceive a conflict of 
interests based on different identities. Importantly, new growing generations will change 
their attitude toward the conflict and region only in transparent cooperation. The 
argument of the proposed transformation is that new norms and principles of the new 





This thesis has analyzed the possibility of creating regional complex 
interdependence around the Republic of Moldova for the purpose of solving the 
Transdniestrian conflict in the long run. 
The Transdniestrian conflict, which erupted in the Republic of Moldova after the 
break up of the Soviet Union, represents not only an internal or ethnic conflict, but also a 
conflict with extensive external historical influences. This conflict thus differs from the 
conventional wisdom that emphasizes the internal causes of ethnic conflict. First, the 
Russian Empire, lately the Soviet Union (USSR), and Romania have had external impacts 
on Moldova's nation-state formation process. Those impacts have created the conditions 
for the future potential internal conflict in Transdniestria. The demise of the Soviet Union 
was also the catalyst for the conflict eruption. Second, due to its isolated geographical 
location and limited state capacity to counter external influences, the Republic of 
Moldova has been historically dependent on external states. One of them, Russia, is 
asymmetrically powerful compared to others in that geo-political region. Therefore, even 
if an internal agreement between the authorities of Moldova and Transdniestria is signed, 
it will be always vulnerable to the influence of Russia. Therefore, an external conflict 
resolution approach is also necessary to solve the conflict in the long run. One of them, 
regional complex interdependence around the Republic of Moldova, can solve the 
Transdniestrian conflict, providing the internal agreement is signed, by eliminating the 
grounds for reappearance of the conditions for the conflict in the future. 
The Republic of Moldova, previously known as the Moldavian Soviet Socialist 
Republic (MSSR), has been a historical product of Bessarabia and a small part of the 
former Russian Empire's territory from the left bank of the Dniestr River. The historical 
Bessarabia had been disputed territory between the Russian Empire, later the Soviet 
Union and now Russia, and the Kingdom of Romania, now Romania. In fact, Romania 
became a historical fact due to ethnic nation-state creation embracing "all Romanians" by 
the unification of Wallachia and Moldova in the nineteenth century. Therefore, at that 
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time, the authorities of Romania appealed to all Romanians abroad, including Bessarabia, 
to unify with Romania. Meanwhile, due to strategic considerations, the Russian 
authorities would never consider any possibilities of losing that territory and would apply 
all means to incorporate and to keep that region in the Russian Empire and later the 
Soviet Union. The territory on the right bank of the Dniestr River (future Transdniestria) 
would be used to check and balance any integrationist moves of Bessarabia and Romania. 
In short, specifically to Eastern Europe, the Republic of Moldova (former Bessarabia) 
during the initial nation-formation became a zone of struggle between the new ethnic 
state of all Romanians, Romania, and Russia (the Soviet Union). The territory of the right 
bank of the Dniestr River (future Transdniestria) was constantly used as a psychological 
check factor. 
During that confrontation, Bessarabia became a territory shifting back and forth 
between Romania and the Soviet Union. Correspondingly, to control this territory, these 
states applied harsh policies, which created a polarized mood in the Moldovan society. 
Initially, after the Russian Empire's collapse in 1918, Bessarabia united with Romania. 
However, for Russia losing Bessarabia was seen as a defeat and a strategic territorial loss. 
Therefore, taking advantage of the large Moldovan population on the other part of the 
Dniestr River, Moscow created the artificial Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist 
Republic (MASSR - future Transdniestria) in 1924 to facilitate the penetration of the 
Soviet propaganda into the Kingdom of Romania and to press its territorial claim for 
Bessarabia. The 1939 Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact led to the incorporating of Bessarabia 
into the Soviet Union. However, the Second World War and the Romanian alliance with 
Nazi Germany radically impacted Bessarabia and especially Transdniestria, which 
became the worst case of the Romanian Holocaust. As a result of such events, three 
factors would become crucial in the development of the future Moldavian Soviet Socialist 
Republic (MSSR). First, the Moldovans/Romanians of Bessarabia would be considered 
unreliable citizens of the Soviet Union (allies of Fascist Romania). Second, the 
Transdniestrians would in contrast play the key roles in the life of the MSSR. Third, the 
Soviet Union policy would result in significant purges of Moldovans and Romanians. 
Eventually, efforts by the Transdniestrian elite to mobilize the population during the 1992 
conflict used the factor of historical memory extensively. 
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The Soviet period in the MSSR reflected the old-fashioned Russian goal of 
dominance over the occupied territory with one exception: the policy was amplified by 
Communist ideology and directed toward Soviet nation building, full secularization, 
repression, and Russification. However, the Romanian authority never lost sight of 
Bessarabia at that time and did everything possible to sustain the Romanian spirit among 
the Moldovans. As a result, by 1970 the new Moldovans began nationally to awake and 
to claim more openly beliefs about their truly Romanian identity. That was accompanied 
by the growing local antagonism toward Moscow. Thus, the antagonism between 
Moscow and Bucharest over the Bessarabian question never disappeared during the 
twentieth century. As a result, the artificial nation building in the Moldavian Soviet 
Socialist Republic would produce tensions between two historic sub-regions, Bessarabia 
and Transdniestria. The Transdniestrian conflict, despite its internal aspects, would be 
again employed by external forces to attain their political objectives. The obvious internal 
tool for such an external policy was the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist 
Republic (MASSR), revived as the Transdniestrian Moldavian Republic since 1991, 
which has always had an elite that is loyal to Moscow (the majority being Russians and 
Ukrainians). The conflict itself was also accompanied by traditional geo-political tensions 
between Moscow and Bucharest concerning rights on historical territories. 
The MASSR, a purposely created and artificially "Moldovan" autonomous 
republic with a Ukrainian majority (50 percent), served as a foreign policy tool of the 
Soviet Union from 1924 to 1939. It facilitated the penetration of the Soviet propaganda 
into the kingdom of Romania and ensured that Bessarabia remained a topical issue in 
international politics.  Nowadays, the current Transdniestrian elite has been trying to 
repeat these techniques since 1990. Additionally, by the end of 1990s, the Republic of 
Moldova's local elite for the first time became dominant over the former privileged 
Transdniestrian elite. Both elites became aware of the differences within Moldova in 
national awareness and with growing antagonisms associated with differences in identity, 
and they consequently employed them as a weapon to attain their political objectives, 
which resulted in the military conflict. Even in this situation, the Russian and Romanian 
authorities were also carefully monitoring the situation trying to influence the internal 
conflict in their favor. 
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The catalyst for the conflict was again an external factor, the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, which resulted in a temporary regional power vacuum and democratization 
of Moldovan life accompanied by the national awakening. Meanwhile, the gravest 
concern of Moscow and Transdniestria was the possibility that historical Bessarabia 
would reunite with Romania. However, the subsequent conflict reflected a miscalculation 
by Moscow and the Transdniestrian elite about the new Moldovan elite and population's 
dedication toward their new motherland, the Republic of Moldova, rather than Romania, 
which became friendly, but not their political homeland. Nevertheless, from the Russian 
point of view, the de facto Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic precluded the unification 
of the Republic of Moldova (Bessarabia) with Romania. In short, the conflict proved also 
to be amplified by historical tensions between the Soviet Union (later on Russia) and 
Romania regarding the Bessarabian dispute. 
Due to strong direct and indirect Soviet (Russian) support to Tiraspol, the military 
actions by themselves proved to be more advantageous for the Transdniestrian side, 
which succeeded in persuading neighboring Ukraine and Russia to intervene for the 
defending of all Slavs. The cease-fire situation left ripe the possibility for future political 
battles, and the accidental triggering of future conflicts. In short, this thesis demonstrated 
that the internal conflict with its military actions proved also to be about relations 
between the Soviet Union (later on Russia) and Romania, which were historically 
antagonistic. Therefore, this thesis argued that as long as the Russia-Romania-Ukraine 
triangle is not interconnected in complex interdependence, the internal conflict resolution 
will always be vulnerable. 
The conflict resolution has demonstrated several factors. First, asymmetrically 
powerful Russia indeed controlled the Transdniestrian political elite. Second, to repeat 
history by creating for a second time the MASSR in the form of the Dniestr Moldovan 
Republic has been impossible because of the different situation: the Republic of Moldova 
did not have a strong intention of joining Romania. Moreover, Ukraine had a Russian-
speaking population in Crimea and worried about a similar development inside Ukraine; 
therefore, they revised their policy not to support secession. Third, not only Russia's but 
also the other external actors' interests collided in that region, which had not been there 
before. Independent Ukraine became a strong factor, Romania has been a traditional 
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factor in the Republic of Moldova (Bessarabia), and the United States of America became 
one of the dominant factors in Europe as well as the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe and North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Therefore, even though 
the political conflict resolution seems to be an attempt to solve an ordinary internal 
conflict between two belligerent parts, external actors have played an important role in 
the peace process. Thus, analyzing the conflict resolution, this thesis agrees that internal 
agreement should be a basis for the solution. However, any internal solution will be 
always fragile because of the external states' differing views regarding the Republic of 
Moldova. Even if an internal agreement is reached, the Republic of Moldova will be 
always dependent on demonstrating its commitment to the East in the current regional 
order. The more Moldova attempts to move west, the more the Transdniestrian problem 
will surface. Thus, stability in the Republic of Moldova, with its vulnerable geographical 
location and limited state capacity, will depend on cautious Moldovan foreign policy and 
interactions between Romania, Ukraine, and an asymmetrically powerful Russian 
Federation. Therefore, this thesis argues that to strengthen the internal (bottom-up 
approach) agreement in the long run, the external approach (top-down) under 
international supervision resolving the Transdniestrian conflict is essential. The external 
agreement should not duplicate past mistakes and should interconnect the external 
players with the support of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the 
United States of America, and the European Union. 
Evaluating the external approaches derived from international relations theory, 
this thesis argued that the realism approach toward resolving the Transdniestrian conflict 
would contribute only toward short-term results. In the long-term perspective, no matter 
who influences the Republic of Moldova/Transdniestria, the situation will be vulnerable 
to external political impacts and changes of the status quo in the international/regional 
order. Due to its small size and vulnerable location, the Republic of Moldova will not 
have the capability to counter possible external influence. Thus, in the long run, the 
situation in Transdniestria can be easily destabilized again if gains and losses of the 
external actors become disproportional to their expectations. 
In contrast to realists, liberalist and constructivist scholars emphasize the growing 
role of international organizations and non-state actors, and the socially constructed 
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nature of the international environment. From their perspective, new actors could 
influence the internal conflict of the Republic of Moldova, leading it toward peaceful 
resolution. However, the conflict resolution concerning Transdniestria has demonstrated 
that mediators should also not exclude the realist assumptions, as noted in Chapter IV, 
about the interest and power of external states, which have the ability to influence the 
internal situation in the Republic of Moldova. Furthermore, in the short run, these 
external actors will be the most effective actors. In conclusion, the authorities of the 
Republic of Moldova and outside mediators in addition to seeking an internal solution 
should also concentrate on an external approach to increase interconnections among the 
actors to secure the settlement in the long run.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
In addition to a negotiated internal agreement under international auspices, the 
international actors should also concentrate on eliminating the pre-conditions for conflict 
and diminishing the asymmetric external influences in the Republic of Moldova. That 
will eliminate the possibility that the conflict will become cyclical. Thus, eventually to 
solve the Transdniestrian conflict in the Republic of Moldova, this thesis recommends 
creating regional complex interdependence around the Republic of Moldova. That 
resolution basically suggests interconnecting the countries interested in this geo-political 
region: Romania, Russian Federation, and Ukraine. This proposal presumes linking 
external and internal approaches by involving multiple actors in multiple channels of 
cooperation. Creating a regional free trade zone presents an important element for 
starting interdependence, which would interest all states in connecting the Russian market 
with Europe's Southeastern markets. Combating common threats and maintaining 
regional stability would also contribute to the common interest to facilitate economic 
cooperation. 
By proposing regional complex interdependence around the Republic of Moldova, 
this thesis recommends the Republic of Moldova establish transgovernmental relations 
with Romania, Russia, and Ukraine. Additionally, these states' agendas with each other 
should include multiple issues besides security and politics. As discussed in Chapter IV, 
importantly, all these interconnections should represent Moldova, Romania, Russia, and 
Ukraine equally. Additionally, the Republic of Moldova with international support should 
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carefully conduct foreign and economic policies aimed at eliminating existing 
vulnerabilities in raw material and energy resources. Furthermore, the financial 
investments of Russia, Romania, and Ukraine in Moldova should be symmetrically 
proportional to exclude the dependence of Moldova, especially the Transdniestrian 
region, on any one of the external states. Thus, creating complex interdependence around 
the Republic of Moldova will contribute to the internal conflict resolution by reducing the 
existing state's vulnerabilities to manipulation by external actors.      
This thesis assumes that due to evolving world and regional security situations, 
the region around the Republic of Moldova will not likely have military inter-state 
confrontations in the near future. Therefore, the evolving complex interdependence will 
have time to establish strong links at all levels, which will potentially change the regional 
regime and constructively eliminate the precondition for a Transdniestrian conflict in the 
future. First, military confrontations between Russia and Ukraine are not likely. 
Meanwhile, Romania will not be militarily threatened by Russia or Ukraine. Next, due to 
evolving Russia-US and NATO-Russia cooperation and the shifting focus of strategic 
instability from Europe to the Middle East and Far East, the region around the Republic 
of Moldova will not experience geo-strategic tensions sufficient to provoke military inter-
state confrontations.  
In conclusion, this thesis recommends that the United States of America and the 
European Union support the internal conflict resolution and the creating of regional 
complex interdependence around the Republic of Moldova under the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe umbrella. These actors will balance the asymmetrical 
power of Russia in the region in the short-term, thereby allowing the complex 
interdependence to evolve in the long-term. The final argument of the proposed 
transformation is that the new norms and principles of the complexly political and 
economical interdependent regime will in time eliminate the conditions for the 
reemergence of the Transdniestrian conflict. Overall, such a situation will contribute to 















































APPENDIX I. HISTORICAL TIMELINE145 
1526 Bessarabia (Moldova) exists as part of the 
Ottoman Empire 
1791 Eastern Moldavia is annexed by Russia 
28 May 1812 Bessarabia is annexed by Russia 
15 December 1917 The Moldavian Democratic Republic is 
proclaimed by the Council of State (Sfatul 
Tarii) 
18 January – February 1918 Ukrainian (Ukrainian People's Republic) 
intervention in Bessarabia 
19 January – March 1918 Romanian intervention in Bessarabia 
6 February 1918 Council of State proclaimed independence 
from Russia – the Moldovan Democratic 
Republic is formed 
9 April 1918 Council of State accepted the Romanian 
protectorate 
10 December 1918 Incorporation into Romania completed 
10 October 1924 Moldavian ASSR established (future 
Transdniestria) in the Ukrainian SSR by 
the Soviet Union 
28 June 1940 Bessarabia incorporated into the Soviet 
Union (from August 2, 1940, renamed – 
Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic) 
25 July – 22 August 1944 Reincorporation into Romania 
                                                 
145 Mari Coliece Poe Pepper, "Returning to the Past?: The Political Implications of Communist 
Electoral Victory in Post-Soviet Moldova," Thesis (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 2001), 57. 
74 
15 September 1947 Reincorporation into the Soviet Union (de 
facto 1944) 
23 June 1990 The Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova 
(sovereign) 
23 May 1991 Republic of Moldova (name changed) 
27 August 1991 Moldovan Independence declared 
1 December 1991 Transdniestria declared independence from 
Moldova (not recognized) 
25 December 1991 Independence effective (upon dissolution 
of the USSR) 
December 1991 – June 1992 Transdniestrian military conflict 


























APPENDIX II. ABBREVIATIONS 
CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States 
CFE – Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty 
EU – European Union 
GUUAM – Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova Cooperative Initiative 
MASSR – Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic 
MSSR – Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic 
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
OSCE – Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
UN – United Nations Organization 
US – United States of America 
















"About the Stability Pact." Special Coordinatior of the Stability Pact for South Eastern 
Europe, 31 December 2001 <http://www.stabilitypact.org/stabilitypactcgi/ 
catalog/cat_descry.cgi?prod_id=1806>.  
 
Adler, Emanuel and Barnett, Michael. Security Communities. Chapters 3 and 11. 
Cambridge University Press, 1998. 
 
Axelrod, Robert. The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books: A Member of the Perseus 
Books Group, 1984. 
 
Berend, Ivan T. Decades of Crisis: Central and Eastern Europe before World War II. 
Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998. 
 
Bremer, Ian and Taras, Ray eds. New States New Politics: Building the Post-Soviet 
Nations. Cambridge University Press, 1997. 
 
Brown, Michael. "The Causes of Internal Conflict." in Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict. 
ed. Michael Brown et al. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2001. 
 
Brown, Michael ed. et al. Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
The MIT Press, 2001. 
 
Brown, Michael ed. The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict. Center for 
Science and International Affairs John F. Kennedy School of Government Harvard 
University, 1996. 
 
Cahoon, Ben M. "Historical Timeline." World Statesmen.  
<http://www.geocities.com/bcahoon.geo/Moldova>. (15 December 2001) 
 
Cohen, Richard and Mihalka, Michael. Cooperative Security: New Horizons for 




Chayes, Abram and Chayes, Antonia Handles, eds. Preventing Conflict in the Post-
Communist World: Mobilizing International and Regional Organizations. Washington 
D.C.: The Brooking Institution, 1996. 
 
Crowther, William "Moldova: Caught between Nation and Empire," in New States New 
Politics: Building the Post-Soviet Nations. eds. Ian Bremer and Ray Taras. Cambridge 
University Press, 1997. 
 
"Commonwealth of Independent States." Homepage. Executive Committee of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States <http://www.cis.minsk>. (31 December 2001) 
 
Daalder, Ivo H. Antony Lake and the War in Bosnia. Georgetown University: Institute for 
the Study of Diplomacy, School of Foreign Service, 1995 
<http://data.geortown.edu.sfs/programs/isd/>. (20 July 2002) 
 
Dima, Nicolas. Bessarabia and Bukovina. Eastern European Monographs, Boulder: 
Columbia University Press, 1982. 
 
"Duma Will Not Ratify Treaty with Moldova Unless Transdniestrian Conflict is Settled, 
Russian Lawmaker Claims." Politics, MD AZI <http://news.ournet.md//cgi-
bin/ournet/mnews/pagi.cgi?ID=16629&From_Cat=1&d=1> (25 December 2001). 
 
"Enforcement Authority from Ukraine Captured Big Lot of Contraband from 
Transdniestria." INFOTAG, MOLDOVA AZI (1998-2002, Romanian) 
<http://www.azi.md/print/20019/Ro> (24 July 2002). 
 
Evangelista, Matthew. "Historical Legacies and the Politics of Intervention in the Former 
Soviet Union." in The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict. ed. Michael E. 
Brown. Center for Science and International Affairs John F. Kennedy School of 
Government Harvard University, 1996. 
 
Fedor, Helen ed. Belarus and Moldova: Country Studies. Washington: GPO, 1995. 
 
Flux. "President of Romania, Ion Iliescu, Declared in Moscow that Annexation of 
Bessarabia by the USSR Was a Historical Crime." MOLDOVA AZI  
<http://www.azi.md/print/20018/Ro> (7 July 2002). (Romanian) 
 
79 
Ganguly, Rajat and Taras, Raymond C. Understanding Ethnic Conflict: The International 
Dimension. New York Longman: Adison Wesley Longman, Inc., 1998. 
 
Gartner, Heinz ed. et al. Europe's New Security Challenges. Lynne Rinner Publishers: 
Boulder and London, 2001. 
 
"George Soros Against Settling Transdniestrian Problem Through Federalization of 
Moldova." INFOTAG, MOLDOVA AZI (1998-2002) <http://Moldova%20Azi%20-
%20Federalizarea.htm> (21 October 2002). 
 
Gur, Ted Robert and Harff, Barbara. Ethnic Conflict in World Politics. Westview Press, 
Inc., 1994. 
 
Handel, Michael. Weak States in the International System. Harvard: Frank Cass and 
Company Limited, 1981. 
 
Hill, William (The OSCE Ambassador).  "Transdniestria." in Resolving Conflicts in the 
Caucasus and Moldova: Perspectives on the Next Steps. Conference Report, 6-7 May 




Huntington, Samuel. The Clash of Civilization: Remaking of World Order. Touchstone 
Book, 1997: 167-168. 
 
Ioanid, Radu. The Holocaust in Romania: The Destruction of Jews and Gypsies under the 
Antonescu Regime, 1940-1944. Chicago: Ivan R Dee, 2000. 
 
Jones, R.J. Barry and Willetts, Peter, eds. Interdependence on Trial: Studies in the 
Theory and Reality of Contemporary Interdependence. New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1984. 
 
Kaufman, Stuart J. "Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova's 
Civil War." International Security, volume 21, issue 2 (Autumn, 1996). 
 




Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S. Power and Interdependence: World Politics in 
Transition. Harvard: Little, Brown and Company, 1977. 
 
Kellas, James G. The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity. Chapter 7. MacMillan 
Education Ltd., 1991. 
 
King, Charles. "Eurasia Letter: Moldova with a Russian Face." Foreign Policy, no 97 
(Winter 1994). 
 
King, Charles. The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politics of Culture. Stanford: 
Hoover Institutions Press, 2000. 
 
King, Charles. "Nations in Transit 2001: Moldova." Research and Publications. Freedom 
House <http://216.119.117.183/research/nattransit.htm> (26 November 2001). 
 
Krasner, Stephen D. "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regime as 
Intervening Variables." in International Regimes. ed. Stephen D. Krasner. Cornell 
University Press, 1983. 
 
Krasner, Stephen D. ed. International Regimes. Cornell University Press, 1983. 
 
"Legal Structures of the Ukraine Caught a Big Contraband Lot from Transdniestria." 
BASA-PRESS (2002), Moldova Azi <http://www.azi.md/print/20019/Ro> (24 July 
2002).  
 
Litskai, Valerii. "Ukrainian Guarantee Should Be Real." Official Site of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic, 10 <http://www.mfa-
pmr.idknet.com/smi/index/php?lang=rus&options=1&id=0&next=1> (29 July 2002). 
(Russian) 
 
Luard, Evan. The International Regulation of Civil Wars. Chapter 8 (Cyprus). London: 
Thames and Hudson, 1972. 
 
"Modern Moldova with Bessarabia and Transdniestria Annotated." Map. Europe: 




"Moldova's Integration into European Union Remains a Priority, Premier Tarlev Says." 
BASA-PRESS (2002), Moldova Azi <http://www.azi.md/print/21176/En> (16 October 
2002). 
 
"Moldova Seeks Closer Moscow Ties." 16 April 2001. World: Europe. BBC News 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk./hi/enlgish/world/Europe/newsid_1279000/1279940.stm> (3 
December 2001).  
 
"Moldova Has Turned Its Face to Russia, Ambassador Petrovsky Says." INFOTAG. 
MOLDOVA AZI <http://Moldova520-Russia.htm>  (13 August 2002). 
 
Muhin, Vladimir. "Transdniestrian Authorities Do Not Allow the Russian Military Assets 
Out of the Region." Russian National Information Service-Strana.Ru (2000) 
<http://www.strana.ru/How%20much%20munition%20in%20Transnistria.htm>  
(11 October 2002). (Russian) 
 
Muir, Ramsay. The Interdependent World and Its Problems. Kennikat Press, 1971, first 
published in 1933. 
 
Nantoi, Oazu. "Research about the Situation in the Eastern Districts of the Republic of 
Moldova (1992-2000)." Publications. Institute for Public Science (Republic of Moldova) 
<http://www.ipp.md/publications> (11 August 2002). (Romanian) 
 
"NATO-Russia Relations: A New Quality." Declaration by Heads of State and 
Government of NATO Member States and the Russian Federation at the Rome Summit – 
28 May 2002. NATO Official Site <http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b020528e.htm> (8 
October 2002). 
 
Official Site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic 
<http://www.mfa-pmr.idknet.com/ >. (20 August 2002) 
 
"OSCE Mission to Moldova." OSCE Official Site  
<http://www.osce.org/publications/survery/survey04.htm>. (11 August 2002) 
 
Pasat, Valeriu. Severe Truth of History: Deportation from the Territory of the Moldavian 
SSR 40-50s. Chisinau: Momentul, 1998. (Russian) 
82 
 
Pfaltzgraff, Robert L., Jr. and Shultz, Richard H., Jr. eds. Ethnic Conflict and Regional 
Instability: Implications for U.S. Policy and Army Roles and Missions. Section I and II. 
Strategic Studies Institute: US Army War College, 1994.  
 
"Press Handout: The Stability Pact and Moldova." 6 December 2001. Special 
Coordinator of the Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe 
<http://stabilitypact.org/index.shtml> (31 December 2001). 
 
"Press-conference of the Minister of the Foreign Affairs of DMR V. Litskai." Official 
Site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic, 12 
<http://www.mfa-pmr.idknet.com/smi/index/php?lang=rus&options=1&id=0&next=1> 
(29 July 2002). (Russian) 
 
"Presidents of Russia, Ukraine and Moldova Requested from the Customs and Border 
Agencies to Put an End to the Contraband at the Transdniestrian Border." BASA-PRESS 
(2002) <http://www.basa.md/news/shownews.asp?ID=77120&PP+TOP-
NEWS&PAC=First&Pagel…> (19 March 2002). (Russian) 
 
"Problems, Estimation, Judgments." Official Site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 
Transdniestrian Moldovan Republic <http://www.mfa-
pmr.idknet.com/smi/index/php?lang=rus&options=1&id=0&next=1>  (29 July 2002). 
(Russian) 
 
Project "Military Aspects of Conflict Solution in the East Zone of the Republic of 
Moldova." Publications. Institute for Public Science (Republic of Moldova) 
<http://www.ipp.md/publications> (11 August 2002). (Romanian) 
 
Read, Anthony and Fisher, David. The Deadly Embrace: Hitler, Stalin and the Nazi-
Soviet Pact 1939-1941. New York/ London: Norton & Company. 
 
"Results of the Sociological Poll Asserts Growing Rating of the CPM in the Recent 
Months." INFOTAG (2002), Moldova Azi <http://www.azi.md/news?ID=18688> (17 
April 2002). 
 
Resolving Conflicts in the Caucasus and Moldova: Perspectives on the Next Steps. 





Richmond, Oliver P. Mediating in Cyprus: The Cypriot Communities and the United 
Nations. Frank Cass Publishers, 1998.   
 
Rupesinghe, Kumar and Tishkov, Valery A. Ethnicity and Power in the Contemporary 
World. Chapters 3, 4, 5, 8. United Nations University Press, 1996. 
 
"Russian Federation Oversight the Sovereignty of the Republic of Moldova." Reporter-
MD (2001)    <http://www.reporter_md.htm> (22 October 2002). (Russian) 
 
Ryan, Stephen. Ethnic Conflict and International Relations. Dartmouth, England: 
Dartmouth Publish Company, 1995. 
 
Robert Gurr, Ted and Harff, Barbara eds. Ethnic Conflict in World Politic. Westview 
Press, 1994. 
 
Sawyer, Jon. "The Molding of Obedience in Moldova; Russian-Made Rebels Force 
Republic Back into Fold." St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Inc., 12 March 1994 
<http://web.lexis- nexis.com/universe/document?_m=54b748139 
f0ad359a00d800…> (24 March 2002). 
 
Security Council. Topic # 1: Kashmir <http://www.coacs.org/kshmir.html> (19 March 
2002). 
 
Seymore, Bruce II. The Access Guide to Ethnic Conflicts in Europe and the Former 
Soviet Union. Washington D.C.: Access, A Security Information Service, 1994. 
 
Schulze, Hagen. States, Nations and Nationalism. Blackwell Publisher, 1996. 
 
Smirnov, Igor. "Their Situation Improving by Taking Advantage of Us Will Not 
Happened." Official Site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Transdniestrian 
Moldovan Republic, 12 <http://www.mfa-




"Speaker of Parliament Declared Republic of Moldova Keep Intention to Join Russia-
Byelorussia Union." BASA-PRESS (2003), Moldova Azi 
<http://www.azi.md/news?ID=22600> (29 January 2003). (Romanian)    
 
"The Opposition Party is Liquidated in Transdniestria." Reporter. md (2001), Information 
Agency REPORTER-MD 
<http://www.reporter.md/page5.php?id=1034343140&what=1> (15 October 2002). 
(Russian) 
 
TRANSDNISTRIAN CONFLICT. History of the Conflict. Project   
<http://home.moldpac.md/~savelkin/Hystor_of_conf.htm> (08 November 2002). 
 
"The Transdniestrian Authorities Continue to Balk to Admission of the Head of the 
OSCE Mission to the Depots with the Russian Federation Ammunition." News Agency 
INERLIC (Moldova) <http://www.interlic.md/print/php?id=1032266912&lang=eng> (17 
September 2002). 
 
"Ukrainian Communists' Leaders Accuse Kiev Officials in Favoring Armament 
Smuggling from Transdniestria." BASA-PRESS (2002), Moldova Azi 
<http://www.azi.md/print/20726/Ro> (16 September 2002).  
 




Ungureanu Oleg. "Stability Pact for Southeast Europe – A Means of Integrating the 
Republic of Moldova into Europe." in Highway or Barrier? The Republic of Moldova's 
Integration into Euro-Atlantic Structures. eds. Igor Munteanu and Trevor Waters. 
Conflicts Studies Research Studies: Document Index: Central and Eastern Europe; the 
Balkans, July 2001 <http://www.csrc.ac.uk/frames/frames_page.htm> (10 October 2001). 
 
"Vladimir Putin: Moldavia – Priority Partner for Russia." State Internet-Channel 
"Russia" (2001) <http://www.vesti.ru/news_print.htm.?pid=18216> (7 February 2003). 
(Russian) 
 
Waltz, Kenneth N. "Anarchic Orders and Balance of Power." in Neo-realism and Its 
Critics. ed. Robert O. Keohane. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986. 
 
85 
Waltz, Kenneth N. "Political Structures." in Neo-realism and Its Critics. ed. Robert O. 
Keohane. New York: Columbia University Press, 1986. 
 
Wendt, Alexander. "Anarchy is What States Make of It." International Organizations, 
Spring 1992. 
 
Wight, Martin. "An Anatomy of International Thought." Review of International Studies 
(U.K.) 13 (1987): 221-227. 
 
Williams, Colin H. and Kofman, Eleonore. Community Conflict, Partition and 
Nationalism. Chapter 9. Great Britain: Biddles Ltd, Guildford and King's Lynn, 1989. 
 
"World Factbook – Moldova." Central Intelligence Agency. 
<http://www.cia.gov.cia/publications/factbook/geos/md.html> (2 December 2001). 
 
Zucconi, Mario. "The European Union in the Former Yugoslavia." in Preventing Conflict 
in the Post-Communist World: Mobilizing International and Regional Organizations. ed. 














































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
87 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
3. State Partnership Program  
North Carolina National Guard 
Raleigh, North Carolina 
 
4. Center for Civil-Military Relations 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
5. Donald Abenheim 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
6. Jeff Knopf 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
7. Mikhail Tsypkin 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
8. Matthew Evangelista 
Cornell University 
Ithaca, New York 
 
9. Ministry of Defense 
Republic of Moldova 
Chisinau, Republic of Moldova 
 
10. Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Republic of Moldova 
Chisinau, Republic of Moldova 
 
11. Head of the OSCE Mission in Moldova 
The OSCE Mission in the Republic of Moldova 
Chisinau, Republic of Moldova 
